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ALIENATING ALIENS: EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS IN 
THE STRUCTURES OF STATE PUBLIC-BENEFIT SCHEMES 
Gregory T. W. Rosenberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 28, 2009, Hawaii’s Department of Human Services an-
nounced its plan to cease enrolling certain legally residing1 aliens in 
its federally supported Medicaid programs and to disenroll aliens al-
ready covered by the programs.2  Letters soon went out to the affect-
ed population, informing them that they would be switched to a sole-
ly state-funded insurance program called “Basic Health Hawaii.”  
That new program would provide a limited number of outpatient vis-
its, inpatient hospital days, and prescriptions.3  But the switch to Basic 
Health Hawaii eliminated coverage for life-saving treatments—
including dialysis and chemotherapy—that Hawaii’s resident aliens 
were receiving through Medicaid. 
Hawaii has not been the only state to reduce or altogether elimi-
nate public benefits for its legally residing alien population.4  Several 
states have turned to such health benefit reductions (as well as elimi-
 
*   J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., American University. I am grateful to Janet Alexander for 
very helpful comments on early drafts, to Jenna Sheldon-Sherman for invaluable advice 
on structure and clarity, and to Garrison Cox for lending his editing acumen. I also thank 
the staff of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their hard work on this Article.    
 1 I use this term to refer generally to aliens that have some form of documented legal sta-
tus.  Specific categories of alien status are reviewed below in Part I.B. 
 2 News Release, Hawai’i Dep’t of Human Servs., DHS Moving Non-Citizen Adults into New 
Medical Assistance Program, ‘Basic Health Hawai’i,’ on September 1 (July 28, 2009) (on 
file with author). 
 3 Complaint at Exhibit B, Sound v. Koller, No. CV09-00409, (D.Haw. Aug. 31, 2009), 2010 
WL 1992198, sub nom. Korab v. Koller, No. CV10-00483 (D.Haw. Aug. 23, 2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 18, 2011, ch. 5, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws § 271 (amending 2010 Wash. 
Sess. Laws § 212) (restricting alien eligibility for Washington State Basic Health pro-
gram); 2011 Me. Laws 580 (terminating health benefit coverage to certain resident al-
iens); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:78-3.2 (2010) (restricting alien eligibility for NJ FamilyCare 
Program, which offers subsidized health insurance to low-income adults and children); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 65, § 31 (2009) (restricting alien eligibility for the Commonwealth 
Care Health Insurance Program); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1224 (Md. 2006) (de-
scribing the state’s failure to appropriate funds for medical benefits to certain resident al-
ien children and pregnant women while funding similar benefits to citizens). 
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nating other types of welfare benefits5) as a way of containing costs in 
light of budgetary pressures.6  Facing the potentially dire conse-
quences7 that would follow from losing such critical benefits, legally 
residing aliens in many of these states have filed lawsuits seeking in-
junctions against the restrictive measures.  A common thread 
through each of these lawsuits is the claim that the state has violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 
This Article is the first to broadly review the decisions of state and 
federal courts that have addressed aliens’ equal protection challenges 
to their exclusions from state-run public-benefit programs.  As courts 
and scholars have recognized, 9 these lawsuits present a difficult ques-
 
 5 See, e.g., Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the elimina-
tion of Washington’s Food Program for Legal Immigrants); Doe v. Comm’r of Transi-
tional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Mass. 2002) (recounting certain aliens’ ineligibil-
ity for the state’s “transitional aid to families with dependent children” (TAFDC) pro-
program). 
 6 See, e.g., Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 977 
(Mass. 2012) (describing the “drastically reduced revenue estimate” that motivated state 
lawmakers to cut benefits for resident aliens); Guaman v. Velez, 23 A.3d 451, 461 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (noting the state’s estimate of $20 million in Fiscal Year 2011 
savings from the disenrollment of resident aliens from NJ FamilyCare and an additional 
$24.6 million in Fiscal Year 2011 savings from the non-enrollment of aliens not already 
enrolled in the benefit program). 
 7 For instance, the plaintiffs in Sound, 2010 WL 1992198, did not know whether they would 
continue receiving life-saving treatments after August 31, 2009, the last day they were to 
be enrolled in the comprehensive Medicaid programs.  See Complaint, supra note 3, at 7.  
Most plaintiffs were dialysis patients for whom death could have come as early as five days 
from their last treatment.  Id. at Declaration of Dr. Neal A. Palafox.  After pressure 
mounted from a series of marches, a sit-in in Governor Linda Lingle’s office, and lawsuits, 
Hawaii’s Department of Human Services announced that the state found a source of $1.5 
million in federal funds to cover dialysis treatments for certain resident aliens as an 
emergency service for the next two years.  State Finds $1.5M for Dialysis, HAW. STAR-
BULLETIN (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/content/
20090901_State_finds_15M_for_dialysis. 
 8 The Equal Protection Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 9 See, e.g., Tricia A. Bozek, Comment, Immigrants, Health Care, and the Constitution:  Medicaid 
Cuts in Maryland Suggest that Legal Immigrants Do Not Deserve the Equal Protection of the Law, 
36 U. BALT. L. REV. 77, 80 (2006) (concluding that “the courts in Maryland should apply a 
strict scrutiny test to the . . . cuts in Medicaid funding affecting legal immigrants and de-
clare those cuts unconstitutional.”); Liza Cristol-Deman & Richard Edwards, Closing the 
Door on the Immigrant Poor, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 141 (1998) (discussing the changes in 
benefits to immigrants caused by the PRWORA and the constitutional issues it raised); 
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
787, 795 (2008) (arguing that a “federalism lens is a particularly fine tool for determining 
the proper allocation of immigration authority among levels of government and is vastly 
superior to the blunt tool of structural preemption”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with 
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997) (arguing that “the Personal 
Responsibility Act presages new possibilities for state-level modulation in immigrant poli-
cy that will more efficiently represent wide state-to-state variations in voter preferences 
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tion that the Supreme Court’s alienage equal protection jurispru-
dence does not clearly resolve:  What standard of review must a court 
apply to the exclusion of aliens from solely state-funded and joint-
funded10 benefit programs when Congress has delegated (or “de-
volved”11) some of its policymaking authority to the states?  Absent 
clear precedents, some courts have treated these alien exclusions as a 
federal immigration policy that warrants a deferential, rational basis 
review standard;12 other courts have viewed the exclusions as state-
level alienage classifications that must withstand strict scrutiny.13 
Drawing on recent cases, I argue that the categorical approach 
that courts have taken—labeling the alienage classification as either 
“state” or “federal” and applying the attendant standard of review—
ignores the nuances of alien status under federal law and how that 
status dictates the underlying policy options available to states for 
their provisions of public benefits.  The argument proceeds in four 
parts.  Part I will explain the equal protection doctrinal framework 
applied to aliens and how the alien-eligibility scheme enacted as part 
of the 1996 federal welfare reform challenges that framework.  Part II 
will review the limited relevant case law in three groups:  (1) exclu-
sion of aliens from joint-funded benefit programs by reason of a uni-
form federal rule; (2) exclusion of aliens from joint-funded benefit 
programs for which federal law permits eligibility; and (3) exclusion 
of aliens from solely state-funded benefit programs.  Part III will then 
propose guideposts for courts to use when reviewing similar alienage-
based equal protection challenges. 
 
and that may ultimately benefit aliens as a group”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Big-
otry?  Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
493, 493 (2001) (concluding that “any devolution of authority over immigration to the 
states, such as that contained in the 1996 welfare reforms, may not receive the judicial 
deference traditionally granted to federal immigration law”); Note, The Constitutionality of 
Immigration Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247 (2005) (discussing various court decisions 
on the constitutionality of the PRWORA). 
 10 I use this term to refer to a benefit program supported by both state and federal funds. 
 11 Much of the scholarship in this area refers to Congress’s “devolving” its power to set im-
migration policy.  E.g., Roger C. Hartley, Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymak-
ing:  A Separation of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 93 (2007) (“For 
roughly a decade, federal legislation has devolved to the states some of Congress’s author-
ity to adopt immigration policies that discriminate against permanent resident aliens.”); 
Wishnie, supra note 9, at 496 (describing the relevant federal statute as “an attempt by 
Congress to devolve some of the exclusively federal immigration power to the states”). 
 12 See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying rational ba-
sis review); Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 1999 SD 108, ¶ 18, 598 N.W.2d 887, 892 (S.D. 
1999) (same). 
 13 See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1243 (Md. 2006) (applying strict-scrutiny re-
view); Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) (same). 
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Finally, Part IV will use those guideposts to identify alienage-based 
equal protection violations that have not been challenged in the cases 
reviewed.  Those cases focused on state conduct that clearly and di-
rectly affected aliens—e.g., statutes or administrative regulations that 
ended eligibility for public benefits that aliens previously enjoyed.  
But proper equal protection review requires an assessment of the un-
derlying policy choices that states make when structuring their provi-
sions of public benefits.  I identify three such state-level policy choices 
that effect alienage classifications and should thus be invalidated un-
der strict scrutiny review.  Because these policy choices are far more 
common among the states than the types of state actions challenged 
in cases to date, the argument advanced here could significantly ex-
pand the scope of alienage equal protection litigation.  I also recom-
mend how states can alter their public-benefit schemes to remedy the 
identified constitutional defects. 
I.  PRUDENTIAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
A.  The Graham and Mathews Decisions 
Two Supreme Court decisions govern the landscape of challenges 
to government classifications based on alienage.  In the first, Graham 
v. Richardson,14 the Court held that laws in Pennsylvania and Arizona 
that restricted welfare benefits to U.S. citizens or imposed durational 
residency requirements on aliens violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.15  The challenged Arizona law conditioned a legally residing 
alien’s eligibility for federally supported welfare benefits on residing 
in the United States for fifteen years.16  Pennsylvania’s law, in contrast, 
extended a solely state-funded welfare benefit to citizens only.17  The 
Court applied strict scrutiny review to both laws because classifica-
 
 14 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 15 Id. at 376.  The Court also noted that these state laws were unconstitutional because they 
impermissibly encroached on exclusive federal power over immigration.  Id. at 379–80.  
While Justice Harlan joined the opinion only with respect to this federalism-based ra-
tionale, the rest of the Court joined Justice Blackmun’s entire opinion. 
 16 Id. at 367.  Arizona argued that the Social Security Act authorized states to impose such 
requirements, id. at 380–81, but the Court applied the avoidance canon of statutory in-
terpretation because the constitutionality of such an authorization would be suspect.  Id. 
at 382–83.  This is the constitutional question confronting state and lower federal courts 
today and which this Article addresses in the context of state-funded and joint-funded 
benefit programs. 
 17 Id. at 368. 
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tions based on alienage are inherently suspect.18  Both states argued 
that the desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its citizens jus-
tified the laws, but the Court found this state interest19 inadequate to 
meet strict scrutiny.20 
Five years later, the Court held in Mathews v. Diaz21 that Congress 
may impose a five-year durational residency requirement before an 
alien is eligible for enrollment in Medicare, a federal health insur-
ance program for the elderly.  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
John Paul Stevens explained that the Constitution gives Congress 
broad powers over naturalization and immigration, allowing Con-
gress to regulate aliens in a manner that it could not regulate citi-
zens.22  These powers, for which there is no state counterpart, justified 
Congress’s line-drawing between citizens and aliens, and within the 
class of aliens, for the provision of welfare benefits.23  The two re-
quirements Congress set for alien eligibility in Medicare—
 
 18 An alien class is a quintessential “discreet and insular minority,” id. at 372 (citing United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), and is particularly vulnerable to political process failures because aliens cannot 
vote.  See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1095 (“Recognizing, however, that ‘discrete and insular 
minorities’ can be shut out of the political process, the [Supreme] Court has applied a 
more searching inquiry to statutes that draw classifications aimed at these 
groups.”)(citation omitted); see also Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1365, 1371 (2007) (“Those who drafted the Equal Protection Clause knew all too 
well that discrimination against noncitizens required constitutional prohibition.”); Press 
Release, Health Law Advocates, Healthcare Advocacy Group Health Law Advocates Chal-
lenges Law Excluding Legal Immigrants From Healthcare (Feb. 25, 2010) (noting that 
legal immigrants “can’t vote—so in a budget crisis, they’re the first ones to suffer” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  The risk of such process failures requires more thorough 
judicial review of laws that target aliens as a class.  See generally JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 19 Subsequent cases have carved out a “political-function exception” by which a state may 
justify an alienage classification, such as barring aliens from becoming state police troop-
ers, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978), and public school teachers, Ambach v. 
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979).  For a limitation on this exception, see Bernal v. 
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227–28 (1984) (refusing to apply the political-function exception 
to notaries). 
 20 Graham, 403 U.S. at 374.  The Court later held that a state alienage classification incon-
sistent with federal law could be struck down as a matter of federal preemption.  Toll v. 
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982).  For an argument advancing the equal protection ra-
tionale, see Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face:  Justice Blackmun and the 
Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1985).  For a critique of applying equal 
protection doctrine to state laws regarding aliens that instead advances a preemption 
view, see David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens:  Preemption or Equal Protection?, 
31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979). 
 21 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 22 Id. at 79–80. 
 23 Id. at 80 (“The real question . . . is not whether discrimination between citizens and aliens 
is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the class of al-
iens . . . is permissible.” (emphasis in original)). 
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permanent-residence status and five years of continuous residency—
were not wholly irrational24 and thus met the Court’s highly deferen-
tial standard of review.25 
The Court noted that Graham did not control the question pre-
sented in Mathews:  Even though the classification was essentially the 
same, the source of the classification was not.26  That Congress, not 
the states, imposed the classification was significant because “the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially dif-
ferent from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal 
power over immigration and naturalization.”27  The Court held that 
the exercise of Congress’s expansive immigration power required ju-
dicial deference.28  Thus, Mathews left Graham intact but clarified that 
its rule of strict scrutiny review did not apply to federal alienage clas-
sifications.29 
Together, Graham and Mathews establish the twin principles that 
the federal government’s power over immigration and naturalization 
 
 24 Id. at 83. 
 25 Id. at 82.  Some scholars contend that Mathews was wrongly decided—i.e., that equal pro-
tection principles require strict scrutiny of any level of government making alienage clas-
sifications.  See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by 
the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 314 (noting that rationales for treating al-
iens as a suspect class, such as the “immutable characteristic” and “political powerless-
ness” theories, apply equally as to state and federal government); see generally Linda S. 
Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 
(1994) (discussing the distinction in the current case law between the scrutiny applied to 
individuals considered “inside” the political community and those considered “outside” 
of it); Tamra M. Boyd, Note, Keeping the Constitution’s Promise:  An Argument for Greater Judi-
cial Scrutiny of Federal Alienage Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319 (2001) (asserting that al-
iens are protected by the same laws as citizens, and that the Supreme Court should set out 
to more strictly review laws that classify based on alienage, even if those laws are enacted 
under the federal power to control immigration and naturalization); see also Raquel Al-
dana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien,” 46 WASHBURN L.J. 263, 296–306 (2007) 
(arguing that Mathews should be challenged and strict scrutiny should apply to federal al-
ienage classifications because “the ‘alien’ construction functions as a proxy for race or na-
tionality”); Note, The Constitutionality of Immigration Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247, 
2270 n.171 (2005) (noting that “[a] reexamination of Mathews has wide support in the le-
gal academy” and citing examples).  This Article, however, works within the current Gra-
ham/Mathews framework so that it can be of practical use to lower courts and practition-
ers. 
 26 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84–85. 
 27 Id. at 86–87. 
 28 Id. at 81–82, 81 n.17.  See also Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power:  Alien 
Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 602–03 (1994) (noting 
the “great deference accorded to Congress on issues of immigration and naturalization” 
illustrated by the Mathews decision). 
 29 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84–85 (noting that while Graham’s holding that states may not regu-
late aliens’ welfare benefits is upheld, this does not mean the federal government is pro-
hibited from such regulation). 
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allows it wide discretion to set the conditions for an alien’s entry and 
residence in the United States, but that states do not have a compa-
rable power.30  Rather, the states have “little, if any, basis” for prefer-
ential treatment of citizens over aliens.31 
This two-tiered doctrinal structure from Graham and Mathews—
strict scrutiny for state welfare laws restricting alien eligibility and ra-
tional basis review for their federal counterparts—functions when the 
source of the classification and the funding for the benefit are clear 
and, in the case of federal classifications, aligned.  State classifications 
are constitutionally infirm, whether the benefit is solely state-funded 
(an equal protection violation), or partially federal-funded (an equal 
protection violation and a Supremacy Clause violation).32  Federal 
classifications are constitutionally permissible for a federal-funded 
benefit.33 
This doctrinal framework does not function adequately, however, 
if the system of providing public benefits to aliens varies from the rel-
atively straightforward scheme of states determining eligibility for 
state-funded benefits and the federal government determining eligi-
bility for federal-funded benefits.  But Congress nonetheless departed 
from that scheme in 1996 with the passage of the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).34  
Among its many reforms to the welfare system, PRWORA redistribut-
ed the decision-making authority over alien eligibility for public ben-
efits between the federal government and state governments.  After 
PRWORA became law, state and federal court decisions reviewing al-
ien eligibility for welfare benefits diverged,35 demonstrating a lack of 
consensus regarding how the Graham/Mathews framework should ap-
ply when the relevant policymaking is in some parts federal and other 
parts state-by-state. 
 
 30 See id. (describing and distinguishing the Graham holding). 
 31 Id. at 85. 
 32 See supra note 20. 
 33 At issue in Mathews was the Medicare Part B medical-insurance program, financed in 
equal parts by the federal government and monthly premiums by the enrollees.  Mathews, 
426 U.S. at 70, n.1. 
 34 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).  Commonly referred to as the Welfare Reform 
Act, the provisions relevant to alien eligibility for public benefits are codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601-1641. 
 35 Compare Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970 (Mass. 
2012) (holding that the elimination of a state-funded benefit for certain aliens violated 
the Equal Protection Clause), and Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001) (same), 
with Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the elimination of 
such a state-funded benefit did not violate the Equal Protection Clause) and Hong Pham 
v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011) (same). 
1424 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
B.  Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits under PRWORA 
Before PRWORA, legally residing aliens had access to most public 
benefits on the same terms as citizens.36  This was true with regard to 
legal permanent residents (holders of “green cards”) as well as any 
other alien who was “permanently residing under color of law” 
(“PRUCOL”).37  But PRWORA dramatically changed the eligibility 
for, and administration of, public benefits for these aliens.38 
Both the text of the Act and its financial implications show that 
PRWORA targeted legal aliens.39  It proclaims a national policy that 
aliens not depend on public resources and that public benefits not 
attract immigrants to the United States.40  Congress also noted in the 
Act that then-current eligibility rules had failed to ensure that aliens 
not burden public-benefit programs.41  Moreover, the cost savings 
from PRWORA attributable to restricting alien eligibility were vastly 
disproportional to the share of total welfare spending that aliens 
comprised.42 
 
 36 See WENDY ZIMMERMANN & KAREN C. TUMLIN, THE URBAN INST., PATCHWORK POLICIES: 
STATE ASSISTANCE FOR IMMIGRANTS UNDER WELFARE REFORM 14-18 (May 1999). 
 37 Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453, 
1458 (1995).  PRUCOL originated as a category in a 1972 amendment to the Social Secu-
rity Act.  See Ryan Knutson, Deprivation of Care:  Are Federal Laws Restricting the Provision of 
Medical Care to Immigrants Working as Planned?, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 401, 414 (2008) 
(citing Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1614, 86 Stat. 1329, 1471 (defining, “[f]or purposes of this ti-
tle, the term ‘aged, blind, or disabled individuals” as, amongst others, “an alien lawfully 
residing in the United States under color of law”)).  The term generally refers to asylees, 
persons paroled into the United States, “and miscellaneous others who remain in the 
United States with the knowledge and permission of the [federal government] and whom 
the [federal government] does not intend to remove.”  Legomsky, supra at 1459.  Plain-
tiffs in Korab and Aliessa, among other cases, include PRUCOLs.  See Korab v. McMana-
man, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1029–30 (describing one set of plaintiffs as residents of coun-
tries with Compacts of Free Association (“COFA”) with the United States) and SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAMS OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM:  GN 00303.400 
AUTHORIZED ALIEN STATUS, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200303400 
(last visited March 17, 2014) (describing COFA residents as “permanent nonimmigrants” 
who fall under the PRUCOL eligibility rules); Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1088 (describing 
plaintiff aliens as falling into two groups, lawfully admitted permanent residents and 
PRUCOLs). 
 38 ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 15. 
 39 See Wishnie, supra note 9, at 511 (“Immigrants, especially legal immigrants, were plainly a 
chief congressional target.”). 
 40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2) (2012) (“It continues to be the immigration policy of the United 
States that . . . the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigra-
tion to the United States.”). 
 41 See id. § 1601(4) (2012) (“Current eligibility rules . . . have proved wholly incapable of 
assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.”). 
 42 The National Conference of State Legislatures estimated that alien benefit cuts account-
ed for $24 billion of PRWORA’s $53 billion in savings.  But $12 billion of those savings 
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But PRWORA’s most significant change with respect to aliens and 
public benefits was the delegation to the states of the authority to re-
strict or expand alien eligibility.43  This shift of authority from the 
federal government to the states “threw a wrench”44 into the Gra-
ham/Mathews framework.  To understand the significance of this shift 
and the divergent court decisions it has produced, one must first un-
derstand PRWORA’s alien-eligibility scheme.  That scheme in part 
dictates what discretion, if any, a state may exercise in determining 
the alien’s eligibility for public benefits. 
Congress built PRWORA’s alien-eligibility scheme on defining two 
primary types of benefits and three categories of aliens.  PRWORA 
distinguishes, according to funding source and administering agency, 
a “federal public benefit,”45 governed by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611–1613, and a 
“state or local public benefit,”46 governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1621.  A bene-
fit funded by both state and federal funds is considered a federal pub-
lic benefit.47  Federal public benefits are further subdivided into two 
 
were retracted when Congress restored Supplemental Security Income benefits to quali-
fied aliens residing in the United States before 1996 who were already receiving SSI pay-
ments.  ANN MORSE ET AL., NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, AMERICA’S NEWCOMERS: 
MENDING THE SAFETY NET FOR IMMIGRANTS 1 (1998).  See also Wishnie, supra note 9, at 
511–12 (noting that approximately forty-four percent of PRWORA’s overall federal sav-
ings came from denying benefits to legal immigrants, who make up “a far lower percent-
age of welfare recipients”). 
 43 See Spiro, supra note 9, at 1627 (describing PRWORA as “the Great Devolution,” which 
“eschew[ed] a century of judicially protected exclusive federal authority”). 
 44 Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion:  The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1606 (2008). 
 45 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)(B) defines this term, in relevant part, as “any retirement, welfare, 
health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, 
unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are 
provided . . . by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United 
States.” 
 46 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) follows the same definition structure as § 1611(c), except substituting 
“agency of a state or local government” for “agency of the United States” and “funds of a 
state or local government” for “funds of the United States.”  For ease of reading, I refer to 
these benefits as “state public benefits” or, to contrast joint-funded benefit programs, as 
“solely state-funded benefit programs.” 
 47 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(3) provides that a state public benefit “does not include any Federal 
public benefit under section 1611(c) of this title,” indicating that public benefits with 
federal and state funding sources are “federal public benefits” under PRWORA.  This in-
terpretation of the two sections appeared in regulations proposed, but not adopted, by 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice.  See Verifica-
tion of Eligibility for Public Benefits, 63 Fed. Reg. 41662-01, (proposed Aug. 4, 1998) 
(proposing that various entities providing “Federal public benefits” verify the eligibility of 
its alien recipients); Interim Guidance on Verification of Citizenship, Qualified Alien Sta-
tus and Eligibility Under Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 62 Fed. Reg. 61344 (proposed Nov. 17, 1997) (same).  A regu-
lation on “affidavits of support on behalf of immigrants” adopts a similar interpretation of 
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groups:  (1) “specified Federal programs,” defined as food stamps 
and supplemental security income (SSI)48; and (2) “designated Fed-
eral programs,” defined as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), social services block grants (SSBG), and Medicaid.49 
“Specified federal programs” are wholly federally funded, while 
“designated federal programs” are jointly funded.  Medicaid pro-
grams, which provide health benefits to certain low-income popula-
tions, are state-run and state-funded but receive substantial federal 
reimbursements.50  TANF “replaced the former federal welfare pro-
gram popularly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children”51 
and, along with SSBG, provides federal block grants to assist state-
funded efforts to provide needy families assistance while moving 
them towards self-sufficiency.52  Nearly all of the alien equal protec-
tion litigation to date has challenged exclusions from Medicaid, 
TANF, and solely state-funded programs that provide benefits com-
parable to Medicaid and TANF.53  This Article concentrates on those 
programs.54 
PRWORA classifies aliens into three categories:  (1) “qualified al-
iens”; (2) “nonimmigrants”; and (3) aliens who are neither qualified 
aliens nor nonimmigrants (I will call this group “undocumented al-
iens”).55  A qualified alien is a legal permanent resident.56  A nonim-
 
the PRWORA definitions, noting that a state public benefit is “any public benefit for 
which no Federal funds are provided.”  8 C.F.R. § 213a.1 (2000) (defining “means-tested 
public benefit”). 
 48 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3) (2012). 
 49 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3) (2012). 
 50 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (making appropriations for “making payments to States which have 
submitted . . . State plans for medical assistance”). 
 51 Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 182 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 52 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf 
(describing the nature and goals of the TANF program). 
 53 A notable exception is Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the 
elimination of Washington’s Food Assistance Program for Legal Immigrants, a solely 
state-funded food benefit).  The reason for this focus on Medicaid and TANF programs is 
that, as explained, infra note 63, states do not have discretion to determine alien eligibil-
ity for food stamps or SSI. 
 54 I do not focus on exclusion of aliens from specified federal programs because PRWORA 
applies a uniform federal rule to alien eligibility for wholly federally funded benefits.  
These benefits thus fall neatly under the Mathews rule of rational basis review.  See cases 
cited, infra note 89. 
 55 Courts have misinterpreted PRWORA as creating only two categories—qualified aliens 
and non-qualified aliens—which lumps together lawfully residing nonimmigrants, such as 
the Korab plaintiffs, with unlawfully present aliens.  See, e.g., Doe v. Comm’r of Transition-
al Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 406 n.2 (Mass. 2002) (“A ‘qualified alien’ is one who has 
some legal residency status in the United States.  An alien who is not ‘qualified’ does not.” 
(citation omitted)); Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1090–91 (N.Y. 2001) (“Under ti-
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migrant is an alien meeting the definition of that term provided in 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.57  Undocumented aliens, the 
third category of aliens under PRWORA, lack a recognized legal sta-
tus by the federal government and thus do not meet the definition of 
either qualified aliens or nonimmigrants.58  Generally, qualified aliens 
have greater potential eligibility for federal and state public benefits 
than nonimmigrants, and nonimmigrants have greater potential eli-
gibility than undocumented aliens. 
The qualified-alien category is further subdivided based on when 
the alien entered the United States and how long he or she has resid-
ed with qualified-alien status.  Aliens legally entering on or before 
August 22, 1996 (“pre-enactment aliens”) and aliens residing in the 
United States with qualified-alien status for at least five years (what I 
will call “the five-year bar”)59 have greater potential eligibility for pub-
lic benefits than qualified aliens not meeting either of those condi-
tions. 
Chart 1,60 summarizes how PRWORA matches these categories of 
aliens and benefits into an eligibility scheme.  PRWORA gives indi-
vidual states the authority to determine a qualified alien’s eligibility 
for state public benefits,61 benefit programs using federal TANF62 
 
tle IV, aliens are divided into two categories:  qualified aliens and non-qualified aliens.” 
(citation omitted)).  Some PRWORA provisions apply to nonimmigrant and non-
qualified aliens equally, but others, like eligibility for state and local public benefits, do 
not.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012) (providing that “an alien who is not a qualified al-
ien . . . is not eligible for any Federal public benefit”) with 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (provid-
ing that “aliens who are not qualified aliens or nonimmigrants [are] ineligible for State 
and local public benefits).  Thus, PRWORA’s distinction between these three categories 
of aliens is important. 
 56 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2012) (definition of “qualified alien”).  Qualified aliens also include 
specific aliens that are not legal permanent residents, including Cuban and Haitian en-
trants, asylees, refugees, and certain victims of spousal or parental battery.  Id. 
 57 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2012) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)).  This definition covers a wide 
range aliens who are present in the United States under color of law, generally on a tem-
porary basis.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(2) (listing various 
classifications of nonimmigrants). 
 58 See supra notes 55, 57.  PRWORA bars aliens who are neither qualified aliens nor nonim-
migrants from receiving state public benefits unless the state “affirmatively provides for 
such eligibility” through a statute enacted after August 22, 1996.  8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) 
(2012).  This same bar does not apply to nonimmigrants. 
 59 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2012). 
60 See infra Chart 1. 
 61 8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012) (“[A] State is authorized to determine the eligibility for any State 
public benefits of an alien who is a qualified alien . . . .”). 
 62 States have the option of administering TANF funds as a separate federal benefit, or 
combining it with state funds into a joint-funded benefit program.  See 45 C.F.R. § 263.2 
(2005) (outlining which state expenditures count towards meeting a State’s “Mainte-
nance of Effort” expenditure requirements). 
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funds, and Medicaid.63  But Congress reserved two exceptions to this 
broad grant of authority to states.  First, the five-year bar on eligibility 
for TANF and Medicaid is mandatory; a state cannot enroll a quali-
fied alien in either program until five years after the alien attains 
qualified-alien status.  Second, a qualified alien who has worked forty 
qualifying quarters as defined in the Social Security Act or is a veteran 
or on active duty in the armed forces64 must be eligible for state65 and 
federal66 public benefits. 
In contrast, state discretion over nonimmigrant eligibility is nar-
rower.  A state can determine whether a nonimmigrant receives state 
public benefits, but not federal public benefits.  Nonimmigrants are, 
with few exceptions, mandatorily ineligible for federal public bene-
fits.67 
Undocumented aliens are presumptively ineligible for state public 
benefits.  These aliens may receive such benefits only if a state “af-
firmatively provides for such eligibility” through a state statute enact-
ed after PRWORA’s enactment.68  They are categorically barred from 
federal public benefits. 
Courts must give careful attention to the particular legal status of 
aliens bringing equal protection challenges for two reasons.  First, an 
alien’s legal status under PRWORA dictates, in part, the options 
available to states for providing public benefits.  As I will explain fur-
ther, those state options in turn bear on the appropriate standard of 
equal protection review to apply. 
Second, legal status has constitutional significance independent of 
PRWORA as well.  The Supreme Court noted in Plyler v. Doe that 
states have greater leeway to draw classifications that disfavor individ-
uals who entered the United States illegally and thus are not a suspect 
 
 63 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1),(3) (2012) (defining Medicaid as a “designated Federal program” 
and stating that “a State is authorized to determine the eligibility of an alien who is a 
qualified alien . . . for any designated Federal program”).  States may not set eligibility for 
the federal-funded SSI or food stamp programs.  These two programs are “specified Fed-
eral programs” under 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3), and not “designated Federal programs” un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3), which means that states do not have authority to determine a 
qualified alien’s eligibility for either program.  Id. § 1612(b)(1).  PRWORA generally bars 
aliens from receiving these two types of federally funded benefits.  Id. § 1612(a)(1) (not-
ing that qualified aliens are ineligible for specified Federal programs except for those 
outlined by statute); 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012) (“[A]n alien who is not a qualified al-
ien . . . is not eligible for any Federal public benefit . . . .”). 
 64 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I), (a)(2)(C)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
 65 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2) (2012). 
 66 8 U.S.C. § 1622(b)(2)–(3) (2012). 
 67 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012). 
 68 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2012). 
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class.69  Such state-drawn classifications are not subject to strict scruti-
ny.70  Thus, the same discriminatory state action that would receive 
strict scrutiny if taken against qualified aliens and nonimmigrants 
would receive more deferential review if taken against undocument-
ed aliens.  This distinction explains why the cases reviewed in this Ar-
ticle were brought by both qualified aliens and nonimmigrants but 
not by undocumented aliens.  Likewise, the argument I develop for 
proper equal protection review applies only to the two PRWORA cat-
egories of aliens that have a documented legal status (qualified aliens 
and nonimmigrants). 
II.  PRWORA-ERA CASES 
Congress’s devolving to the states the authority to determine alien 
eligibility for public benefits—an example of what scholars have 
joined Professor Hiroshi Motomura in calling “immigration federal-
ism”71—created an uneven “patchwork”72 of state policies, where simi-
larly situated aliens can receive vastly different benefits solely depend-
ing on their state of residence.  Under PRWORA, some states provide 
little or no state-funded benefits to qualified aliens and nonimmi-
grants, while other states provide them substantial benefits.73  For 
many aliens, states determine eligibility for state-funded benefits and 
benefits heavily subsidized by the federal government, like TANF and 
Medicaid.74  Indeed, the same qualified alien could, for instance, ac-
 
 69 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“[U]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a 
suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a 
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’” (citation omitted)). 
 70 Id. at 226.  See also Maria Pabón López & Diomedes J. Tsitouras, From the Border to the 
Schoolhouse Gate:  Alternative Arguments for Extending Primary Education to Undocumented Alien 
Children, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 1260 (2008) (describing the standard of review ap-
plied in Plyler as “the rational basis standard, albeit ‘with a bite.’” (citation omitted)). 
 71 Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1364 (1999).  However, Motomura supports the view that im-
migration power is exclusively federal.  See Spiro, supra note 9, at 1627 n.* (crediting Hi-
roshi Motomura with coining the phrase); see, e.g., Huntington, supra note 9; Peter H. 
Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 63 (2007); Spi-
ro, supra note 9; Wishnie, supra note 9, at 508. 
 72 I borrow this term from ZIMMERMAN & TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 14–18. 
 73 ZIMMERMAN & TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 49.  See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANTS’ ELIGIBILITY FOR SNAP, TANF, MEDICAID, AND CHIP 19 
(2012), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/11/ImmigrantAccess/Eligibility/ib.shtml 
(comparing alien eligibility for state-funded benefits among the states). 
 74 For example, states can deny such joint-funded benefits to aliens who arrived in the Unit-
ed States prior to PRWORA’s enactment, to qualified aliens even after the mandatory five-
year bar, and to nonimmigrants.  See ZIMMERMAN AND TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 15 (out-
lining where states have the option of determining eligibility). 
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cess TANF benefits in Louisiana but not Mississippi,75 or Medicaid 
benefits in Pennsylvania but not Ohio.76  Some states facing budget 
difficulties have taken advantage of the discretion PRWORA affords 
them, eliminating benefits for qualified aliens and nonimmigrants as 
a viable cost-saving measure.77 
Alien challenges to this patchwork system of public benefits have 
produced divergent decisions in state and federal courts.78  Courts 
struggle to fit the alienage-based eligibility classifications within the 
Graham/Mathews doctrinal structure because those classifications are 
neither clearly state nor clearly federal.  Unlike Arizona and Pennsyl-
vania’s pre-PRWORA laws reviewed in Graham,79 these eligibility classi-
fications are now made with congressional approval.80  Likewise, the 
classifications are distinct from those drawn by the federal eligibility 
requirement reviewed in Mathews.  That requirement was a uniform, 
nationwide rule and applied to Medicare, a solely federal-funded 
benefit.81 
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, federal and 
state courts have employed inadequate equal protection analyses to 
reach inconsistent decisions.82  The following three categories of cases 
will demonstrate how the current judicial methodology fails to meet 
the twin foundations of Graham and Mathews:  preventing states from 
favoring their resident citizens over their resident aliens (Graham) 
and allowing the federal government wide latitude in regulating the 
terms and conditions of alien entrance and residency (Mathews). 
 
 75 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANTS’ ELIGIBILITY, supra 
note 73, at 31. 
 76 Id. at 13–14, 16. 
 77 See supra note 6. 
 78 See supra note 35. 
 79 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367–68 (1971) (describing the state laws ultimately 
declared unconstitutional).  See also id. at 382–83 (rejecting Arizona’s argument that fed-
eral law authorized its state statute). 
 80 8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012). 
 81 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1976). 
 82 This is not to say that Graham and Mathews are unable to resolve any challenge brought 
against a PRWORA provision.  Where Congress sets its own uniform eligibility rule for 
federal-funded benefits (SSI and food stamps), it is operating well within the heartland of 
Mathews and courts have correctly applied rational basis review in suits challenging this 
rule.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999); City of Chi. v. 
Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999); Kiev v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Minn. 
1998); Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  Following Mathews, these 
courts have held that Congress’s near-plenary immigration power requires judicial defer-
ence in reviewing a federal determination of how federal funds will be distributed 
amongst classes of aliens.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1346–47 (adopting a narrow 
standard of review in light of the need for “flexibility of the political branches of govern-
ment to respond to changing world conditions”). 
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A.  Exclusions from Joint-Funded Benefits by Uniform Rule 
The first category of cases is challenges brought by qualified aliens 
that have yet to meet the five-year residency threshold for Medicaid 
and TANF eligibility (“QAs<5”).83  These challenges appear to be an 
easy case for the straightforward application of deferential review un-
der Mathews.  Consistent with the Medicare eligibility rule at issue in 
Mathews, PRWORA’s five-year bar is a federal rule that states do not 
have discretion to alter.84  However, PRWORA’s rule applies to bene-
fits that, unlike Medicare, are funded with both federal and state dol-
lars.  Thus, unlike the federal statute reviewed in Mathews, the federal 
rule here restricts alien access to federal funds and the state funds 
that a state chooses to put into a joint-funded benefit program. 
By channeling state funds into a Medicaid program or commin-
gling them with federal TANF funds, a state can block QAs<5 (and 
other legally residing aliens) from accessing state funds but point to 
PRWORA as the source of alien exclusion.  This difference from 
Mathews is significant because PRWORA’s rule allows states to dedi-
cate substantial funds to the benefit of its citizen residents but not its 
legal-alien residents, a result that directly conflicts with Graham.85  As 
outlined below, courts have failed to recognize this difference from 
Mathews or its import.  Because courts focus on PRWORA as the 
source of the alienage classification, rather than the underlying state 
decision to dedicate its funds only to an alien-excluding benefit pro-
gram, they have applied rational basis review to states’ removals of 
QAs<5 from joint-funded benefit programs.  In other words, courts 
have focused on the states’ compliance with mandatory federal rules 
for joint-funded benefit programs, but ignored the antecedent fact 
that state funding of those programs is a state policy choice subject to 
equal protection review.  Decisions from two state high courts 
demonstrate this proposition. 
1.  South Dakota’s Cid Decision 
In Cid v. South Dakota Department of Social Services, two QAs<5 who 
entered the United States in December 1996 challenged on equal 
protection grounds South Dakota’s 1997 regulations implemented to 
comply with PRWORA.86  Under the regulations, the plaintiffs were 
 
 83 8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012); see supra note 59. 
 84 8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012). 
 85 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 368 (1971) (striking down Pennsylvania’s law that 
would restrict state-funded benefits to its citizen residents only). 
 86 Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887, 889 (S.D. 1999). 
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no longer eligible for Medicaid, TANF, and food stamps.87  The South 
Dakota Supreme Court applied rational basis review to the regula-
tions because the state rules were consistent with federal law, which 
bars QAs<5 from receiving joint-funded benefits.88  In applying ra-
tional basis review, the court relied on decisions from federal district 
courts and courts of appeals that upheld PRWORA’s five-year bar ap-
plied to wholly federal-funded benefits.89  Neither the Cid court nor 
any of its cited authority considered whether Mathews should apply to 
joint-funded90 benefits the same way it applies to wholly federal-
funded benefits. 
Since these courts have not acknowledged the difference between 
wholly federal-funded benefits and joint-funded benefits, they do not 
offer a justification for why the Mathews standard of review should 
apply to a state’s implementation of a federal rule restricting alien el-
igibility for state funds.  The Cid decision is correct insofar as Mathews 
recognizes federal power to limit alien access to federal benefits.  The 
problem with Cid is that its application of Mathews’s deferential stand-
ard of review to the denial of a joint-funded benefit allows South Da-
kota to do what Graham forbids—afford preferential treatment to its 
resident citizens over its resident aliens through its choice of how to 
fund public benefits.91  Nothing in Mathews or Graham suggests that a 
state’s commingling its funds with federal funds shields from strict 
scrutiny the state’s choice to commit such funds to the benefit of citi-
zens and not aliens.  Even though PRWORA’s five-year bar sets a uni-
form rule for alien eligibility in joint-funded benefit programs, states 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 892. 
 89 The court cited Kiev v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Minn. 1998) (upholding a feder-
al law denying food stamp benefits to certain groups of documented noncitizens under 
the rational basis test), and Rodriguez v. Unites States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(upholding federal laws denying food stamps and SSI to documented aliens based on ra-
tional basis).  Also cited was Sinelnikov v. Shalala, No. 97C 4884, 1998 WL 164889 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 31, 1998), sub nom City of Chi. v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999), which did 
concern Medicaid and TANF, but adopted the reasoning of Kiev, Rodriguez, and another 
SSI case, Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  Sinelkinov, 1998 WL 
164889 at *11. 
 90 Although technically joint-funded, the federal food stamp program (SNAP) has only 
nominal state financial participation, see Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (“The federal government pays for the other fifty percent of administrative 
costs, as well as the entire cost of the actual food benefits.” (citations omitted)), and is 
functionally a federal benefit. 
 91 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 368, 368 (1970) (describing the Pennsylvania statute 
that violated equal protection as regarding “that portion of a general assistance program 
that is not federally supported” and that was limited to “needy persons who are citizens of 
the United States”). 
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still exercise discretion in funding the benefit programs in the first 
instance. 
2.  Massachusetts’ Doe Decision 
Doe v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance92 provides a similar, but 
more complicated, example of a court applying Mathews-style defer-
ence where equal protection principles require a more searching re-
view.  The plaintiffs in Doe were QAs<5 and also had resided in Massa-
chusetts for less than six months.93  They challenged a state statute 
that, pursuant to the five-year bar, made plaintiffs ineligible for the 
state’s “transitional aid to families with dependent children (TAFDC) 
program.”94  The TAFDC program combined federal TANF funds 
with state funds to support a cash-assistance benefit for its low-income 
residents.95  At the same time, Massachusetts created a solely state-
funded supplement to TAFDC that provided comparable benefits to 
QAs<5 who would no longer be eligible for TAFDC because of the 
five-year bar.96  The state imposed a six-month Massachusetts residen-
cy requirement for enrollment in the supplemental program.97 
Consistent with Cid, the Doe court found that Graham’s strict-
scrutiny rule did not apply to the plaintiffs’ challenge to their TAFDC 
ineligibility because the state was merely adopting a mandatory, uni-
form federal rule, passed pursuant to Congress’s immigration pow-
ers.98  Although Graham provides the “general rule” for “State laws 
that discriminate against legal immigrants,” the court found that 
“[t]his general rule does not apply . . . to State laws that merely adopt 
uniform Federal guidelines regarding the eligibility of aliens for ben-
efits.”99  But the Doe plaintiffs, unlike the Cid plaintiffs, also chal-
lenged their exclusion from a solely state-funded benefit program.  
The court held that rational basis review also was appropriate for the 
 
 92 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002). 
 93 Id. at 407–08. 
 94 Id. at 407. 
 95 Id; See also MASS. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Cash Assistance, available at 
http://www.mass.gov/dta/assistance (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (describing TAFDC as cash 
assistance to families with children and pregnant women who have little income or as-
sets).  Massachusetts’s commingling of federal TANF funds with state funds was optional.  
States have wide latitude in how they spend the TANF funds, which they receive as block 
grants from the federal government.  See infra notes 284–89 and accompanying text. 
 96 Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 407. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 409 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82–83 (1976) and Sudomir v. McMahon, 
767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 99 Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 409. 
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state supplemental program’s eligibility requirements because the 
state was under no obligation to provide this benefit,100 which meant 
that the classification used was not alienage, but rather “Massachu-
setts residency.”101 
3.  Massachusetts’s Finch Decision 
Nine years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-
visited the issue of the appropriate standard of review to apply to the 
exclusion of aliens from a joint-funded benefit program.102  The 
plaintiffs in the class action Finch v. Commonwealth Health Insurance 
Connector Authority challenged103 a Massachusetts statute that eliminat-
ed their eligibility for Commonwealth Care, “a premium assistance 
program in which enrollees pay a portion of their health insurance 
premium based on a sliding scale with the remainder paid by the de-
fendant [Connector].”104  “Both State and Federal funds105 support the 
provision of premium assistance payments on behalf of Common-
wealth Care enrollees.”106  Commonwealth Care is a Medicaid 
“demonstration project”107 that operates much like a regular Medicaid 
 
100 Id. at 411. 
101 Id. at 414.  The court noted that the state was not discriminating between citizens and 
aliens, but among a sub-class of aliens on the basis of bona fide Massachusetts residency.  
Id. 
102 See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass. 
2011) (“[S]hould a State classification based on alienage be subjected to a ‘rational basis’ 
standard of review . . . ?”). 
103 The plaintiffs asserted equal protection claims under both the United States and Massa-
chusetts Constitutions.  After the state removed the case to federal court, the plaintiffs 
dismissed the federal constitutional claim to get the case back into state court.  Id. at 
1268.  However, “[i]n matters concerning aliens, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
has been interpreted to provide a right to the equal protection of the laws, coextensive 
with the Federal right.”  Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 408. 
104 Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1265. 
105 The federal contribution to the program is approximately fifty percent of total expendi-
tures, but was even higher (61.59 percent) in fiscal year 2010 due to the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  Id. at 1267.  As such, “at least two federally eligible res-
idents (citizens or federally eligible aliens) could be enrolled in Commonwealth Care for 
the same cost to the State as one member of the plaintiff class.”  Id. 
106 Id. at 1266. 
107 42 U.S.C. § 1315.  Congress has given the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services the power to waive certain requirements of state-administered welfare 
programs, including Medicaid, so long as the Secretary determines the program is a 
“demonstration project.”  Id. § 1315(a).  These projects are also referred to as “Section 
1115 projects” or “Section 1115 waivers” because of the section of the Social Security Act 
by which they are authorized.  See also EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS21054, MEDICAID AND SCHIP SECTION 1115 RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS 
(2004) (explaining the unique provisions of Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, 
which give broad authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to modify 
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program but uses state funds to extend coverage to some classes of 
federally ineligible individuals,108 including the plaintiff class of al-
iens.109  This coverage ended for the plaintiffs in 2009 when the state 
adopted for Commonwealth Care the same alien-eligibility standards 
PRWORA sets for federal-funded public-benefit programs.110 
Whereas Massachusetts’s high court held in Doe that the exclusion 
of aliens from the joint-funded TAFDC program need only survive ra-
tional basis review,111 it concluded in Finch that the exclusion of aliens 
from the joint-funded Commonwealth Care program must be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny.112  The court distinguished the two cases 
by explaining that while Congress dictated the eligibility rule at issue 
in Doe, in Finch the state voluntarily adopted an eligibility rule that 
Congress neither required nor prohibited.113  Describing the termina-
tion of Commonwealth Care benefits for aliens, the court noted that 
“[w]here the State is left with a range of options including discrimi-
natory and nondiscriminatory policies, its selection amongst those 
options must be reviewed under the standards applicable to the State 
and not those applicable to Congress.”114 
4.  Doe and Finch Are Not Distinguishable 
Applying rational basis review to a state’s acquiescence to a uni-
form eligibility rule imposed by Congress,115 while holding to strict 
 
SCHIP and Medicaid without congressional review).  Although the Finch court explains 
that “Commonwealth Care receives no reimbursement from the Federal government in 
respect of expenditures made on behalf of federally ineligible individuals,” 946 N.E.2d at 
1267, this may not be the case for all demonstration projects.  See Spry v. Thompson, 487 
F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that demonstration projects can expand coverage 
to individuals who otherwise would not be eligible for Medicaid, with the state receiving 
federal reimbursement as if those individuals were eligible). 
108 For instance, the program extended coverage to individuals with a household income 
level below 300 percent of the federal poverty level who are uninsured and “not eligible 
for certain other State, Federal or employer-subsidized health insurance programs.”  
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1266. 
109 Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1267.  Commonwealth Care’s enabling statute provided eligibility for 
not only “qualified aliens,” but also nonimmigrants.  Id. at 1266. 
110 Id. at 1267. 
111 Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Mass. 2002) 
112 Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1277.  The court later determined that the alien exclusion failed 
strict scrutiny and thus violated equal protection.  Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. 
Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 984 (Mass. 2012). 
113 Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1275–76. 
114 Id. at 1277. 
115 See Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding under rational 
basis review a California law that adhered to a uniform federal policy requiring states to 
deny welfare assistance to certain aliens).  The Sudomir court stressed that Congress had 
enacted a uniform rule, such that the court did not have to address the indication from 
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scrutiny a state’s decision to parrot that eligibility rule when Congress 
does not so require, is a sound application of the Graham/Mathews 
equal protection framework.  But the Finch decision does not ade-
quately articulate how a mandatory PRWORA provision was at work 
in the TAFDC programs (Doe) but not in Commonwealth Care 
(Finch).  It notes that PRWORA permits alien eligibility for Com-
monwealth Care “so long as no Federal funds contribute to such 
benefits.”116  The court implicitly assumed that Commonwealth Care 
met this condition because the state received federal funds based on 
its expenditures for only federally eligible enrollees.117  This assump-
tion is not only incorrect, but it also fails to distinguish Doe. 
The court’s assumption was wrong because the federal and state 
funds in a benefit program such as Commonwealth Care are fungi-
ble.  When similarly situated aliens and citizens receive the same level 
of benefits from a joint-funded program, they benefit equally from 
the federal contribution, even if that contribution was calculated 
based only on citizen enrollees.  A simplified example will demon-
strate the point:  Suppose I am going to order pizza for a group of 
students and you agree to reimburse me for fifty percent of what I 
spend on pizza for students who wear glasses.  If I divide the pizza 
that our combined funds purchased equally among all of the stu-
dents, then they all will benefit equally from your subsidy, regardless 
of whether they wear glasses.  The same principle applies to the fed-
eral subsidy of Commonwealth Care.118 
The court’s assumption also fails to distinguish Doe.  Like the 
Commonwealth Care benefits for federally ineligible enrollees in 
Finch, the supplemental TAFDC program in Doe was solely state-
funded.  Under Finch, this similarity would mean that in both situa-
tions the state is acting of its own discretion, with no mandatory 
PRWORA rule to apply.  The state was in the same position with re-
 
Graham “that Shapiro may require the invalidation of congressional enactments permitting 
states to adopt divergent laws regarding the eligibility of aliens for federally supported 
welfare programs.”  Id. at 1466–67.  
116 Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1276.  The court cited 8 U.S.C. §§ 1622, 1624, & 1621(d), the 
PRWORA provisions that authorize states to determine alien eligibility for state benefits. 
117 Id. at 1267 (“[Massachusetts] assumed one hundred per cent of the cost of providing 
Commonwealth Care subsidies to federally ineligible aliens.”).  See id. at 1276 (explaining 
how the state did not argue that it was in fact required to apply PRWORA’s alien-
eligibility rule to Commonwealth Care, presumably because the program did not follow 
that rule in its first three years of operation). 
118 See id. at 1285 (Gants, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining how the 
use of “twice the State funds per capita” to provide the same health benefits to PRWORA-
barred aliens that Medicaid-eligible citizens and aliens receive nullifies the effect of 
PRWORA’s bar). 
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spect to supplemental TAFDC as it was with the solely state-funded 
portion of Commonwealth Care:  It had a “range of options including 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies, [and] its selection 
amongst those options [had to] be reviewed under the standards ap-
plicable to the State.”119  And in both cases, the state selected a dis-
criminatory policy.  In Finch, that policy was ending PRWORA-barred 
aliens’ eligibility for Commonwealth Care; in Doe, it was applying a 
six-month durational residency requirement on PRWORA-barred al-
iens’ receipt of supplemental TAFDC, a condition that did not apply 
to citizens’ receipt of TAFDC.120  Despite these similarities, the Doe 
court applied rational basis review to the latter,121 while Finch held 
that the former must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.122 
Surely the formality of denominating TAFDC and supplemental 
TAFDC as separate programs, as compared to the state-funded and 
joint-funded portions of Commonwealth Care falling under a single 
program umbrella, cannot justify the different standards of review 
applied,123 and neither Finch nor Doe suggest that it does.  Contrary to 
the Finch court’s reasoning, the same mandatory, uniform federal 
rule (i.e., the five-year bar) applied to the benefit programs in both 
cases.  What the court failed to recognize is that the five-year bar did 
not dictate the state’s policy choice of how to divide its welfare dollars 
between joint-funded benefit programs (for which most aliens are in-
eligible) and solely state-funded benefit programs (for which 
PRWORA allows all aliens to be eligible). 
That state-level policy choice—combining state funds with federal 
funds to create the TAFDC and Commonwealth Care programs—
exists entirely apart from and antecedent to the application of 
PRWORA’s five-year bar.  It thus cannot be shielded from judicial 
scrutiny based on an argument that the state is complying with a fed-
eral mandate instead of exercising its own discretion.  By choosing to 
 
119 Id. at 1277. 
120 Although the state chose to merely withhold the benefit during a qualified alien’s first six 
months of Massachusetts residency, integral to the Doe court’s holding was the “undisput-
ed” fact that “the Massachusetts Legislature was not required to establish the supple-
mental program.”  Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Mass. 
2002).  Thus, the opinion’s logic dictates that a decision to eliminate the benefit entirely 
need satisfy only rational basis review. 
121 See id. at 414 (“Where, as here, [the] classification is Massachusetts residency, the proper 
standard of review is rational basis.”). 
122 See Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1277 (“Settled equal protection law therefore requires that [the 
statute] be reviewed under strict scrutiny”). 
123 See Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a state 
“could not evade strict scrutiny” simply through the formality of creating separate pro-
grams). 
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combine state funds with federal funds, Massachusetts voluntarily 
adopted the federal eligibility rule.  The court should have recog-
nized this state policy choice and applied strict scrutiny to the six-
month durational residency requirement in Doe just as it did to the 
termination of state-funded Commonwealth Care benefits in Finch. 
5.  The Finch Dissent:  Requiring Equal Per-Capita Funding 
In his dissent to the Finch majority’s conclusion that strict scrutiny 
is the appropriate standard of review to apply to Massachusetts’s ex-
clusion of the plaintiff aliens from Commonwealth Care, Justice 
Ralph Gants, joined by Justice Robert Cordy,124 recognized that “sub-
stantially less” state expenditures per capita for the plaintiff aliens 
than similarly situated Commonwealth Care enrollees would be a 
state alienage classification subject to strict scrutiny.125  This recogni-
tion is nearly correct, with an important caveat. 
The dissenting justices “believe[d] that strict scrutiny is the ap-
propriate standard of review to evaluate a State’s alienage classifica-
tion only where the State’s per capita expenditures” are “substantial-
ly” unequal between similarly situated aliens and citizens.126  This 
statement articulates the general idea of what equal protection review 
requires in these circumstances, but confuses the mechanics.  A state 
alienage classification is always subject to strict scrutiny, with some 
exceptions not relevant here.127  The per-capita expenditures on al-
 
124 That Justice Cordy joined in this dissent is notable because he was the author of Doe.  Alt-
hough consistent with Doe’s holding with regard to alien exclusion from TAFDC, this dis-
sent undermines Doe’s validation of the durational residency requirement imposed on al-
iens receiving supplemental TAFDC.  That latter holding depended on the preliminary 
conclusion that the supplemental TAFDC program was optional and could be entirely 
eliminated.  See Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 411 (“It is undisputed that the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture was not required to establish the supplemental program.”).  Justice Gants’s dissent in 
Finch, however, suggests that, absent a compelling state interest, the state could not elim-
inate all state funding for resident aliens while continuing to fund a program benefitting 
resident citizens.  Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1281. 
125 Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1281 (Gants, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
Gants dissented only because he concluded that the plaintiffs had not yet shown on the 
limited record in the case that they were “suffering discrimination in the expenditure of 
funds derived from State revenues.”  Id.  Neither Justice Gants nor the majority suggest 
that the state provides plaintiffs any type of state-funded benefit that would be compara-
ble to the state’s per capita expenditures in Commonwealth Care.  Assuming there is no 
such program, the basis for Justice Gants’s dissent is unfounded.  He identified much of 
the correct analysis, but reached the wrong result. 
126 Id. 
127 See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984) (“We have, however, developed a nar-
row exception to the rule that discrimination based on alienage triggers strict scrutiny.  
This exception has been labeled the ‘political function’ exception and applies to laws that 
 
May 2014] ALIENATING ALIENS 1439 
 
iens relative to citizens does not directly change the level of scrutiny 
applied to a state alienage classification, as Justice Gants suggests, but 
rather determines whether there is a state alienage classification in 
the first place.  If the state spends equal amounts on aliens and citi-
zens alike, then it has not classified on the basis of alienage and the 
equal protection inquiry never reaches the selection of a standard of 
review.128  With that said, Justice Gants’ dissent is the first judicial 
opinion to correctly observe that a state’s financial participation in a 
joint-funded benefit program implicates the equal protection rights 
of individuals excluded from that program on the basis of alienage.129 
6.  The Risk of Improper Application of Mathews’s Deferential Review 
As a result of the Doe opinion’s equal protection analysis, Massa-
chusetts could continue barring a number of legally residing aliens, 
such as nonimmigrants, from receiving a state-funded benefit (sup-
plemental TAFDC), even though state dollars were supporting a simi-
lar benefit for citizens (primary TAFDC), federally eligible aliens 
(primary TAFDC), and some federally ineligible aliens (supplemental 
TAFDC).  The state could also place a six-month durational residency 
requirement on the state benefit given to QAs<5 that it did not place 
on individuals receiving primary TAFDC.  But the improper applica-
tion of Mathews to joint-funded benefits could have a much broader 
impact.  Because the Mathews analysis leads courts to the conclusion 
that solely state-funded benefits for federally ineligible aliens are en-
 
exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-
government.”). 
128 To be sure, an alienage classification would remain if citizens receive a higher level of 
benefits because their benefit program has federal support.  But that classification would 
be federal and thus subject to rational basis review if challenged. 
129 I note briefly that a potential distinction between Commonwealth Care and the TAFDC 
programs, although not recognized by the Finch court, could support the different out-
comes in Finch and Doe.  Commonwealth Care was available for uninsured resident citi-
zens with household incomes up to 300 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL).  Finch, 
946 N.E.2d at 1266.  The federal government, however, sets an income ceiling on the var-
ious categories of Medicaid-eligible populations for which it will provide funding.  42 
C.F.R. § 435.1007 (2012).  Because these ceilings do not approach 300 percent of the FPL 
for most recipients and because Massachusetts receives federal reimbursement for ex-
penditures on Commonwealth Care enrollees who are federally eligible, Finch, 946 
N.E.2d at 1267, it appears that higher-income enrollees are supported solely by state 
funds.  If so, then the state was using its funds to benefit its higher-income resident citi-
zens while, had the statute challenged in Finch stood, making no such expenditures to 
benefit its resident aliens with similar or lower incomes.  This reading provides an equal-
protection basis for requiring the state to retain the plaintiff aliens in Commonwealth 
Care.  So long as the state uses its resources to extend the benefit to federally ineligible 
citizens, it must do so for federally ineligible aliens as well. 
1440 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
tirely optional,130 rather than constitutionally required to match state 
contributions to a joint-funded benefit that excludes legally residing 
aliens, these courts would allow states to deny such aliens public ben-
efits altogether.131 
The danger of cloaking eligibility requirements for joint-funded 
benefits in Congress’s immigration powers is that it allows states to 
funnel state dollars away from legal aliens to citizens, simply by mix-
ing them with federal funds that are tied to alien-excluding provi-
sions.  The state then excludes the legal aliens from the joint-funded 
benefit and argues to the courts that it is merely applying a federal 
eligibility requirement, not adopting its own alienage classification.  
Doe and Cid demonstrate that courts readily accept this argument,132 
protecting a state’s unequal distribution of resources under the 
shield of deferential review, even though such deference is tied to the 
exercise of exclusively133 federal immigration power.  These decisions 
contravene a maxim that the Supreme Court has repeated:  Congress 
may not authorize the states to violate the Equal Protection Clause.134 
Accepting Doe’s and Cid’s application of Mathews appears more 
reasonable when the joint-funded benefit is predominantly federally 
sourced, or at least sourced at a one-to-one ratio.135  The greater the 
proportion of federal dollars in the joint-funded benefit, the more 
justifiable it seems to apply rational basis review to the alien-
excluding provision because the benefit becomes more like the whol-
ly federal-funded Medicare benefit that was the subject of Mathews.  
But as PRWORA is written, and as courts have interpreted Mathews, 
 
130 See Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Mass. 2002) (noting 
that Massachusetts was “not required to establish [its] supplemental program); Soskin v. 
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004) (describing the state Medicaid benefit 
offered to, then withdrawn from, aliens as “optional Medicaid coverage”). 
131 See, e.g., Bruns v. Mayhew, 931 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Me. 2013) (concluding in the course of 
denying a preliminary injunction that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their equal 
protection challenge to the elimination of a state-funded, alien-only health benefit pro-
gram, which left plaintiffs without health benefits altogether). 
132 Accord Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255–56 (explaining how states use separate programs for aliens 
and citizens). 
133 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 380 (1971) (holding that state laws that deny or 
condition welfare benefits to noncitizens “equate with the assertion of a right . . . to deny 
entrance and abode,” and “encroach upon exclusive federal power”); Mathews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67, 84–85 (1976) (holding that the political branches of the federal government 
regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens, not the states). 
134 Graham, 403 U.S at 382; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969); Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).  But see Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254 (criticizing this 
maxim as nearly tautological). 
135 Federal participation in Medicaid is calculated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2011).  
These “federal medical assistance percentage[s]” (FMAP) are available at http://aspe.
hhs.gov/health/fmap.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014). 
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this deferential review would still apply even if the federal portion of 
the benefit is nominal.  And yet a predominantly state-funded benefit 
would appear more like the welfare benefits at issue in Graham for 
which the Supreme Court held that states could not deny on the basis 
of alienage. 
Rather than blessing every joint-funded benefit with Mathews-style 
deference or engage in arbitrary line-drawing with respect to what 
percentage of federal dollars will trigger such deference, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires courts to ensure that state welfare expend-
itures, whether administered separately or commingled with federal 
funds, are not disparately apportioned on the basis of the recipient’s 
alienage.  Such a rule has the advantage of being judicially workable:  
A state need only demonstrate to the court that it has spent the same 
pro-rata funds on benefits for legally residing aliens as it has spent on 
benefits for citizens in the joint-funded program.  But more im-
portantly, it adheres to the requirements of equal protection as in-
terpreted by both Graham and Mathews. 
B.  Exclusions from Joint-Funded Benefits, But Not by Uniform Rule 
1.  Soskin 
The second category of PRWORA-era cases are challenges to a 
state’s exclusion of aliens from a joint-funded benefit for whom 
PRWORA permits eligibility.  This situation arises for qualified aliens 
who have either met or are not subject to the five-year bar, such as 
pre-enactment qualified aliens.136  PRWORA allows individual states to 
determine whether such aliens will receive joint-funded benefits like 
Medicaid and TANF.137 
In Soskin v. Reinertson,138 a class of legally residing aliens challenged 
a 2003 Colorado law139 that rendered them ineligible for Medicaid, a 
benefit program that the state had enrolled them in since 1997.140  
Unlike when states exclude aliens from a joint-funded benefit pro-
 
136 8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012). 
137 See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) (2012) (providing that “a State is authorized to determine the 
eligibility of an alien who is a qualified alien . . . for any designated Federal program (as 
defined in paragraph (3))”).  Such programs include TANF, social services block grants, 
and Medicaid.  8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3)(A)-(C). 
138 Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1244. 
139 S.B. 03-176 § 1 (Colo. 2003) (repealing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26–4–301(1)(l)–(m), (2)–
(4)) (eliminating Medicaid coverage for qualified aliens present in the United States be-
fore August 22, 1996 and for qualified aliens who have been present for five years). 
140 Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1246. 
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gram pursuant to PRWORA’s mandatory five-year bar,141 here Colora-
do exercised discretion at two levels.  First, Colorado chose to con-
tribute state dollars to the joint-funded benefit, as described in the 
preceding section.  Second, it withdrew joint-funded benefits from 
legal aliens for whom PRWORA allowed, and the state had previously 
provided, eligibility.  In contrast to the circumstances underpinning 
Cid and Doe, Colorado was determining access to both state and fed-
eral funds, not just state funds.142 
The Mathews doctrine and its policy rationale do not apply here.  
Whereas Mathews concerned a purely federal-funded benefit adminis-
tered in every part of the country using the same federal-eligibility 
requirement,143 PRWORA authorizes something quite different:  a 
state-by-state determination of alien eligibility for federal funds (the 
federal contributions to Medicaid and TANF) and state funds (the 
state contributions to those same programs).  As explained above, 
Graham prohibits state discrimination on the basis of alienage in the 
provision of state-funded benefits.144  But neither the Graham nor 
Mathews holdings speak to a state’s ability to determine eligibility for 
federal funds when Congress has by statutory design approved such 
state discretion. 
Although the holdings are silent on the issue, Graham sheds some 
light on the proper standard of review in this situation.  In dicta, the 
Graham court acknowledged that Congress has broad power to con-
trol alien admission into the United States and the “terms and condi-
tions of their naturalization,” but that Congress cannot exercise this 
power to “authorize the individual states to violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.”145  The Constitution textually constrains Congress’s im-
migration and naturalization power to establishing “an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization.”146  Although the Graham court did not reach the 
 
141 8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012).  Courts have appropriately upheld state’s complying with manda-
tory eligibility rules under PRWORA.  See, e.g., Avila v. Biedess, 78 P.3d 280, 286 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003); see also Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) (uphold-
ing California’s compliance with a mandatory federal rule that precluded plaintiffs from 
receiving AFDC benefits). 
142 For a critique of Soskin, see Michael Shapland, Soskin v. Reinertson:  An Analysis of the 
Tenth Circuit’s Decision to Permit the State of Colorado to Withhold Medicaid Benefits from Aliens 
Pursuant to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 2 SETON HALL 
CIRCUIT REV. 339 (2005). 
143 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69–70 (1976). 
144 See supra Part I.A. 
145 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 641 (1969)).  See also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999) (“[W]e have consistently 
held that Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
146 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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issue because it applied the constitutional-avoidance cannon to inter-
pret a federal statute to preclude Arizona’s fifteen-year national resi-
dency requirement, it stated that a federal statute that would “permit 
state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship 
requirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear 
to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement of uniformi-
ty.”147 
2.  Soskin’s Misinterpretation of Graham and Mathews 
The Tenth Circuit in Soskin, along with some state courts,148 has 
misinterpreted Graham’s guidance.  Graham stated that there is an 
“explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity”149 and that it 
“would appear” that divergent state eligibility requirements for aliens 
receiving federal benefits would fail to meet this requirement.150  The 
Soskin decision purports to recognize that the only open question, if 
any, from Graham is “whether this appearance of unconstitutionality 
is real.”151  The court’s analysis, however, wrongly suggests that there is 
no uniformity requirement with which PRWORA must comport.152  In 
other words, instead of answering whether PRWORA complies with a 
constitutional uniformity requirement, the court instead concludes, 
contrary to Graham, that there is no such requirement.153 
 
147 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382.  Commentators have critiqued and defended the Court’s con-
clusion that Congress’s immigration power is exclusive and subject to a uniformity re-
quirement.  Compare Huntington, supra note 9, at 831 (arguing that states have some 
measure of inherent power over immigration and alienage law and therefore alienage law 
does not have to be uniform), with Wishnie, supra note 9, at 539 (arguing that each 
source of immigration power—the Naturalization Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clauses, the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, and the extra-constitutional concept of “inherent sovereign-
ty”—is exclusively federal and cannot be devolved to the states). 
148 See, e.g., Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887 (S.D. 1999) (affirming the deci-
sion to terminate certain welfare benefits to a legal resident alien, and holding that such 
denial does not violate the United States or South Dakota Constitutions); Doe v. Comm’r 
of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002) (similarly upholding Massachu-
setts’ TAFDC eligibility requirements). 
149 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382.  Subsequent cases have reiterated this uniformity requirement.  
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (“But if the Federal Government has by uni-
form rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an 
alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction.”). 
150 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. 
151 Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004). 
152 Id. But see id. at 1274 (Henry, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress could not decide on a 
federal policy and instead adopted a “compromise” that promotes variation in policy 
among the states and thus violates the uniformity requirement). 
153 Id. at 1256 (“Of course, if Congressional authority for the PRWORA’s provisions regard-
ing aliens does not rest on the Naturalization Clause, the limits on the exercise of power 
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Although Graham provides154 that Congress’s power in the context 
of regulating alien eligibility for welfare benefits comes from the 
Naturalization Clause,155 the Soskin court reasoned that congressional 
authority for such regulation “does not rest on the Naturalization 
Clause” and that a constraint on power exercised through that 
Clause—the uniformity requirement—does not necessarily apply.156  
The court’s justification for contradicting Graham is that Mathews did 
not refer specifically to the Naturalization Clause.157  But Mathews did 
note that Congress’s ability to make rules for aliens that it could not 
make for citizens stems from “its broad power over naturalization and 
immigration.”158  Mathews does not cast any doubt on Graham’s au-
thority; in fact, the opinion explains its consistency with Graham.159  
Moreover, the Soskin decision ignores the Supreme Court’s later con-
firmation that the federal regulation of aliens reviewed deferentially 
in Mathews was tied to congressional power to establish a uniform rule 
of naturalization, as well as the power to regulate foreign commerce 
and foreign affairs.160 
The issue of uniformity did not arise in Mathews because the Court 
was considering a federal eligibility requirement that obviously ap-
plied uniformly throughout the country.161  Since uniformity was a 
non-issue, the Court had no reason to consider the uniformity con-
straint on congressional power exercised through the Naturalization 
 
under that clause do not necessarily apply; the uniformity requirement is imposed only 
on a ‘Rule of Naturalization.’”). 
154 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382 (noting that Congress has power to “establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4)). 
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
156 See Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256; see also Unthaksinkun v. Porter, No. C11-0588JLR, 2011 WL 
4502050, at *27 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28, 2011) (“The [Soskin] court concluded that a uni-
form rule was unnecessary to authorize the state’s action . . . .”).  The Unthaksinkun deci-
sion goes on to note that “unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has not discarded 
[the] requirement that courts apply rational basis review to suspect classifications only 
where Congress has established a uniform rule.”  Id. (citing Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 
F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
157 Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256. 
158 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976). 
159 Id. at 84-85.  The Court subsequently described federal immigration and naturalization 
power in terms consistent with Graham.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19, 225 (1982) 
(noting the uniformity limitation to federal immigration and naturalization power and 
citing the Naturalization Clause). 
160 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Federal authority to regulate the status of al-
iens derives from various sources, including the Federal Government’s power to establish 
a uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . , its power to regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tionals . . . , and its broad authority over foreign affairs.” (citations omitted)(internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
161 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 70 n.1. 
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Clause.  The Soskin court placed too much significance on the fact 
“that Mathews made no explicit mention of the Naturalization 
Clause,”162 and not nearly enough significance on the fact that Gra-
ham—a decision that Mathews did not disturb—already established 
that the Clause’s uniformity requirement applied when Congress 
regulates alien eligibility for welfare benefits.163 
Recognizing the uniformity requirement is crucial to proper al-
ienage equal protection review because it precludes the casting of 
PRWORA’s grant of discretion to the states as a federal immigration 
policy that requires judicial deference.  State-by-state discretion is cer-
tainly Congress’s “rule” with regard to much of alien eligibility, but it 
is not a uniform rule.  And because a state exercise of discretion is not 
a uniform federal rule, the deference that the Supreme Court has af-
forded such rules is unwarranted.  For this reason, the basic principle 
of Graham holds true—state policy that disfavors a class based on al-
ienage must bear strict scrutiny. 
C.  Exclusions from Solely State-Funded Benefits 
The final category of PRWORA-era cases is challenges to the ex-
clusion of legally residing aliens from solely state-funded benefit pro-
grams.  In this section, I will review Aliessa,164 a 2001 decision from the 
New York Court of Appeals, as a counterpoint to Soskin’s flawed con-
clusion that the Naturalization Clause’s uniform-rule requirement 
did not constrain the power that Congress exercised when enacting 
PRWORA.  I will also offer further support for Aliessa’s conclusion 
that state discretion exercised pursuant to PRWORA does not warrant 
Mathews-style deference. 
Then I will turn to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 2012 deci-
sion in Pham v. Starkowski,165 which, unlike the Aliessa and Soskin deci-
sions, avoids the question of uniformity (and substantive equal pro-
tection analysis altogether) by concluding that Connecticut did not 
classify based on alienage when it terminated the plaintiff class’s sole-
ly state-funded health benefits.  Finally, I will review Pham to critique 
 
162 Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256.  In his lengthy dissent, Judge Robert Harlan Henry argues that 
PRWORA’s devolution of immigration and naturalization powers to the states violates the 
uniformity requirement.  Id. at 1274 (Henry, J. dissenting). 
163 See Wishnie, supra note 9, at 493 (discussing how every source of federal immigration and 
naturalization power precludes the devolution of that power, which would produce non-
uniformity and contradict the notion of sovereignty). 
164 Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001). 
165 Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2012). 
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its threshold disposal of meritorious equal protection claims, which 
other courts have likewise employed. 
1.  Aliessa Applies Strict Scrutiny 
The New York Court of Appeals was the first state high court to 
hold that the discretion that § 1622 accords states does not constitute 
a uniform rule, and therefore strict scrutiny remains the appropriate 
standard of review for state alienage classifications.166  New York ar-
gued in Aliessa that the court should apply rational basis review to a 
state statute that denied qualified aliens and PRUCOLs (who are 
nonimmigrants) access to a state-funded health benefit that it offered 
to its resident citizens.167  The state contended that because it was im-
plementing a federal immigration policy at the direction of Congress 
through PRWORA, Mathews’s rule of deferential review must apply.168 
Unlike the Soskin court’s analysis that would follow three years lat-
er in the Tenth Circuit, the Aliessa court properly read Graham (and 
Plyler169) as limiting deferential review to when the federal govern-
ment dictates an alienage classification by uniform rule.170  PRWORA 
does not meet the uniformity requirement, the court noted, because 
§§ 1621 and 1622 allow the states to extend or restrict benefits for al-
iens, “producing not uniformity, but potentially wide variation based 
on localized or idiosyncratic concepts of largesse, economics and pol-
itics.”171 
The court also recognized that § 1622’s constitutional infirmity is 
even greater than what Graham instructed would be suspect.  Graham 
said that a congressional authorization for states to adopt non-
uniform eligibility requirements for “federally supported welfare” 
benefits would appear to contravene the Naturalization Clause.172  
The Aliessa decision explains that § 1622 goes well beyond this sus-
pect ground by authorizing states to bar legally residing aliens from a 
state-funded benefit.173  As such, the court concluded that New York’s 
statute “must be evaluated as any other State statute that classifies 
 
166 Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1097-98 (discussing the uniformity requirement and concluding 
that Title IV of PRWORA “does not impose a uniform immigration rule for States to fol-
low”). 
167 Id. at 1091–92 (describing New York’s Social Services Law § 122). 
168 Id. at 1096–97. 
169 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1981). 
170 Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1096 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 382 (1971). 
171 Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098. 
172 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. 
173 Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098. 
May 2014] ALIENATING ALIENS 1447 
 
based on alienage” because § 1622’s authorization did not alter the 
power of any state to discriminate against legally residing aliens.174  
Applying the strict scrutiny standard that such state classifications re-
quire, the court held that New York’s statute violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.175 
Aliessa also reached the right result because the power that states 
exercise under § 1622 is distinct from and weaker than the power 
Congress exercised in setting the Medicare eligibility requirements 
that Mathews upheld.  If we conceive a state-level exclusion of aliens 
from state public benefits as an exercise of inherent state police pow-
er,176 then § 1622’s authorization to discriminate cures only the 
preemption defect found in Graham;177 the equal protection violation 
remains.  But if instead the exclusion is an exercise of devolved, fed-
eral power, then we must evaluate how that power stacks against the 
expansive power that Mathews recognized. 
The power that PRWORA ostensibly devolved to the states in 
§ 1622 is the federal power to regulate eligibility for a solely state-
funded benefit.  That power is weaker than the power to set condi-
tions on who can benefit from federal funds (e.g., eligibility for Med-
icare) because it encroaches on the states’ sovereign prerogatives to 
make their own spending decisions.178  This difference in powers is 
what distinguishes § 1622 from § 1612(b), where Congress purported 
to devolve to states the power to set alien eligibility for joint-funded 
benefit programs.179  The substantial federal funds granted to joint-
funded programs provide a direct link to Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause, while the link in the § 1622 context is more tenu-
ous because the benefit is solely state-funded.180 
 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 1098-99. 
176 See,e.g., Huntington, supra note 9, at 820 (discussing how cases from the mid-nineteenth 
century “express[ed] approval of state immigration laws based on state police powers”). 
177 403 U.S. at 374. 
178 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987) (discussing how Congress cannot 
command the states to spend state funds to its liking; rather, it may cajole state coopera-
tion using its Spending Clause powers by offering federal funds with attached condi-
tions). 
179 A conditional grant of federal funds for joint-funded benefit programs is a well-
established exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.  E.g., Rosemary B. 
Guiltinan, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement:  Preemption Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect 
Medicaid Recipients’ Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (2010) (describing Med-
icaid as one such program enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause). 
180 Federal rules controlling the provision of solely state-funded benefits would effectively be 
a “cross-cutting” spending condition tied to federal funds granted to the same state agen-
cy that administers such benefits.  See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between 
Chevron and Pennhurst:  A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Ad-
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In other words, Congress’s power to set eligibility for benefits 
(whether exercised itself or devolved) is strongest when the benefit 
consists of only federal funds and attenuates as the benefit becomes 
more and more state-funded.  Congress has many ways to manipulate 
and influence state spending,181 but its power to directly control its 
own funds is nevertheless greater than its power to influence, but not 
command,182 the spending of state funds. 
The upshot of this assessment of background powers at work in 
PRWORA is further support for Aliessa’s conclusion with respect to 
congressional authorization of state-made eligibility requirements.  
The court found that if, per Graham, such authorizations were consti-
tutionally suspect with regard to federally supported benefits, then 
solely state-funded benefits must engender an even greater constitu-
tional defect.183  The foregoing analysis bolsters that finding and fur-
ther demonstrates why state choices that prefer citizens over aliens in 
the allocation of state welfare dollars are subject to strict scrutiny, 
even under the guise of federal approval. 
2. Pham:  Wrongly Avoiding Equal Protection Review 
Not all challenges to the exclusion of legally residing aliens from 
state public-benefit programs map squarely onto Aliessa’s analytical 
framework.184  In Aliessa, the state benefit denied to legally residing 
aliens was offered to New York’s resident citizens.  But in cases such 
as Pham, Bruns v. Mayhew,185 and Khrapunskiy v. Doar,186 the state bene-
fits in dispute were available only to certain legal aliens and not to cit-
 
ministrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1240 (2004) (contrasting programmatic spending 
conditions, such as Medicaid and TANF, with cross-cutting spending conditions). 
181 For an extensive treatment of the constitutional dimensions of Congress exercising its 
power through conditional spending, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989)(criticizing the Supreme Court’s traditional 
analysis of unconstitutional conditions on governmental benefits). 
182 See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives:  A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1629, 1631–32 (2006)(arguing for a standards and balancing approach to analyzing 
the anti-commandeering doctrine rather than a rules based approach). 
183 Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001). 
184 See Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 404 (Mass. 2002) (scruti-
nizing Massachusetts’s six-month alien residency requirement); see also Soskin v. Reinert-
son, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (scrutinizing the Colorado legislature’s removal of 
the optional Medicaid coverage that it had previously provided to legal aliens); Ehrlich v. 
Perez, 908 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2006) (describing the state benefit for a class of aliens “newly 
excluded” from federal Medicaid).  
185 931 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Me. 2013). 
186 909 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 2009).  Similar cases are Doe, 773 N.E. 2d at 407, and Perez, 908 A.2d 
at 1227 (concerning programs that provided benefits to legally residing alien women and 
children whose benefits were eliminated by the Welfare Reform Act). 
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izens.  Some courts have cited this difference from Aliessa to wrongly 
dismiss claims, concluding that the alien plaintiffs were not similarly 
situated to anyone receiving preferential treatment from the state.187  
Their overly narrow conceptions of class-comparison analysis has led 
them to conclude that states have drawn no alienage classification at 
all and to therefore reject equal protection claims that in fact have 
merit.188 
I will review the Pham decision to provide an example of this mis-
guided analysis and to make two related points in support of properly 
defining the similarly situated classes in these types of equal protec-
tion challenges.  First, assessing whether plaintiffs are similarly situat-
ed to a favorably treated class is part of the substantive equal protec-
tion analysis and is not a separate threshold requirement that 
plaintiffs must overcome.  Second, funding comparable benefits 
through a single program or separate programs is a formal distinc-
tion that does not dictate whether two beneficiaries are similarly situ-
ated. 
Pham addressed a challenge brought by a class of QAs<5189 in 
Connecticut to the loss of two solely state-funded health benefits.190  
One benefit was exclusively for aliens and the other, as in Aliessa, was 
open to aliens and citizens.191  Connecticut created the alien-only 
benefit, called State Medical Assistance for Noncitizens (SMANC), in 
1997 to provide medical assistance to aliens excluded by PRWORA 
from its Medicaid program.192  SMANC is akin to the alien-only sup-
plemental TAFDC benefit at issue in Doe, which was designed to assist 
aliens who PRWORA rendered ineligible for federal TANF funds.193  
The other benefit at issue in Pham was the “State Administered Gen-
eral Assistance Medical program (SAGA-medical).”194 
 
187 E.g., Bruns, 931  F. Supp. 2d at 273 (following the analysis articulated in Pham and con-
cluding that “the Plaintiffs are unable show [sic] they were similarly situated with citizens 
for equal protection purposes”); see also Khrapunskiy, 909 N.E.2d at 77 (“As there is no 
state program of aid for this class, there are no state residents receiving public assistance 
from New York at the level requested by plaintiffs.”). 
188 See, e.g., Recent Cases, Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — New York Court of Appeals Hold 
That State May Restrict Legal Alien Access to Disability Benefits — Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 800, 803 (2010) (criticizing New York’s Khrapunskiy decision for erring in 
“refusing to conduct an equal protection analysis” which would have “turn[ed] the case 
for the plaintiffs”). 
189 Recall that “QAs<5” is my shorthand for qualified aliens that have yet to meet the five-year 
residency threshold for Medicaid and TANF eligibility. 
190 Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 637–38 (Conn. 2011). 
191 Id. at 641–42. 
192 Id. at 641. 
193 Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Mass. 2002). 
194 Pham, 16 A.3d at 642. 
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Until 2009, low-income citizens and legally residing aliens were el-
igible for SAGA-medical if they were not eligible for Medicaid.195  Re-
sponding to budgetary pressures, the Connecticut legislature passed 
Spec. Sess. P.A. 09-05, “which substantially eliminated SMANC,” 
thereby “terminat[ing] publicly funded medical assistance for most 
recipients,” and effectively excluded the plaintiff aliens from SAGA-
medical.196 
A trial court enjoined the state from terminating the Pham plain-
tiffs’ benefits in both programs, but that injunction was short-lived.  
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, concluding that neither 
the elimination of SMANC nor the exclusion of aliens from SAGA-
medical discriminated on the basis of alienage and thus did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause.197  Rather than reach the issue of 
whether rational basis review or strict scrutiny should apply to “state 
classifications based on alienage that are authorized by the federal 
government,” the court instead held that the challenged statutory 
provisions “[did] not discriminate on the basis of alienage.”198  The 
court concluded that only persons still enrolled in SMANC were simi-
larly situated to the plaintiff class.199 
The first problem with Pham’s analysis is that its inquiry into 
whether “the state is affording different treatment to similarly situat-
ed groups of individuals” 200as a “threshold requirement” is not rooted 
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.201  Alt-
hough many state courts202 and lower federal courts, including the 
 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 641–43. 
197 Id. at 664. 
198 Id. at 645. 
199 Id. at 648.  The court alternatively held that even if the plaintiffs in the class were similarly 
situated to citizens enrolled in Medicaid, the state-drawn classification was based on eligi-
bility for Medicaid, not alienage.  Id. at 657–58, 662.  I explain in Part III.D. why this al-
ternative holding is likewise unfounded. 
200 Pham, 16 A.3d at 645. 
201 See Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 581, 598 (2011) (reviewing 
Supreme Court precedent and concluding that the Court “has not historically viewed 
[the phrase ‘similarly situated’] as a separate, threshold requirement, but rather as one 
and the same as the equal protection merits inquiry”). 
202 E.g., People v. Buffington, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 701 (“If persons are not similarly situated 
for purposes of the law, an equal protection claim fails at the threshold.”); Brazas v. Prop. 
Tax Appeal Bd., 791 N.E.2d 614, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“The threshold inquiry in equal 
protection analysis is whether similarly situated persons are treated dissimilarly.”); In re 
Weisberger, 169 P.3d 321, 328 (Kan. 2007) (“[A] threshold requirement for stating an 
equal protection claim is to demonstrate that the challenged statutory enactment treats 
‘arguably indistinguishable’ classes of people differently.” (citation omitted)). 
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First,203 Eighth,204 Ninth,205 and D.C. Circuits,206 have treated class com-
parisons as an independent threshold inquiry, Professor Giovanna 
Shay has noted that the Supreme Court refers to “similarly situated” 
classes when applying “rational review with bite” and “intermediate 
scrutiny.”207  These are two versions of the substantive equal protec-
tion “fit” analysis,208 not separate threshold inquiries.  Moreover, Shay 
observed that the phrase rarely appears in Supreme Court decisions 
concerning suspect classifications, bolstering her argument that the 
phrase describes substantive equal protection principles rather than 
acts as a prerequisite to applying those principles.209  Indeed, if a “sim-
ilarly-situated” showing were a true threshold requirement, it would 
apply to cases involving suspect and non-suspect classifications alike. 
The second problem with Pham is that, putting aside whether the 
similarly-situated inquiry is an independent threshold analysis,210 the 
court wrongly concluded that the plaintiffs were similarly situated on-
ly to other SMANC recipients.211  Instead, the court should have 
viewed plaintiffs as similarly situated to all other Connecticut resi-
dents with comparable characteristics that are relevant to the purpos-
es212 of providing need-based medical assistance (such as income, re-
 
203 Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Here, we look for two ele-
ments:  (1) whether the appellant was treated differently than others similarly situated, 
and (2) whether such a difference was based on an impermissible consideration, such as 
race.”). 
204 Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a threshold showing 
that she is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plain-
tiff does not have a viable equal protection claim.”). 
205 Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Only once this threshold show-
ing is made may a court proceed to inquire whether the basis of the discrimination merits 
strict scrutiny.”). 
206 Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (“The threshold inquiry in evaluating an equal protection claim is, therefore, 
‘to determine whether a person is similarly situated to those persons who allegedly re-
ceived favorable treatment.’” (quoting United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 
1995))). 
207 Shay, supra note 201, at 613–14 (noting the prominence of the phrase in Supreme Court 
cases invalidating legislative classifications under rational basis review and “presag[ing 
the] appearance of intermediate scrutiny” as a standard of review). 
208 Id. at 615–16. 
209 Id. at 614 (“By contrast, the phrase ‘similarly situated’ did not figure as prominently in 
race cases that were reviewed under strict scrutiny.”). 
210 I make this argument because the “threshold” version of the similarly-situated inquiry is 
pervasive in state and lower federal courts, see supra notes 202–06, and appears unlikely to 
be corrected soon. 
211 Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 648–49 (Conn. 2011). 
212 See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 
341, 345–46 (1949) (noting common errors in applying the “similarly situated” analysis 
and concluding that “[t]he inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the classifica-
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sources, age, and disability status) and who are receiving benefits 
funded at least partially by the state.  Getting this class comparison 
correct is fundamental to an adequate equal protection review.213 
To conclude that plaintiffs were not similarly situated to citizens 
enrolled in Medicaid, the Pham court noted that SMANC was a sepa-
rate program from Connecticut’s Medicaid program.  Only aliens 
could enroll in the former, while citizens (and certain aliens not 
barred by PRWORA) could enroll in the latter.  But the separation of 
comparable benefits into two programs or the combination of such 
benefits into a single program is a formal distinction without a differ-
ence for the purpose of determining a similarly situated class.214  The 
Ninth Circuit explained in Pimentel that a state “could not evade strict 
scrutiny simply by first authorizing one state-funded program for citi-
zens and certain aliens and another for a subclass of aliens, and then 
canceling the latter.”215  For instance, Massachusetts’ Commonwealth 
Care program at issue in Finch was administered as a single program, 
with some enrollees funded solely by state funds.216  But the state just 
as well could have administered the benefits in separate programs, 
much as it did with primary and supplemental TAFDC.217  This strictly 
formal alteration would not render the beneficiaries of each program 
differently situated. 
In sum, the problems that I have identified in Pham are not 
unique to that decision.  Other courts have applied a threshold ver-
sion of the similarly-situated analysis,218 concluding that no equal pro-
tection review was required because the plaintiffs could not be com-
pared to individuals receiving benefits in a separate benefit program 
 
tion to the purpose of the law.  A reasonable classification is one which includes all per-
sons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”); see also Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882–83 (Iowa 2009) (explaining that “equal protection demands 
that laws treat alike all people who are similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes 
of the law” and that “[t]he purposes of the law must be referenced in order to meaningful-
ly evaluate whether the law equally protects all people similarly situated with respect to 
those purposes” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
213 See infra Part III.A. 
214 See Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that 
Washington’s “Basic Food Benefits” program, which used a single application form pro-
cessed by the same state agency and did not communicate to recipients whether their 
benefits were state or federal, was in fact “two separately administered programs funded 
by two distinct sovereigns”). 
215 Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1107. 
216 Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 (Mass. 
2011). 
217 Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Mass. 2002). 
218 See Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1106; Bruns v. Mayhew, 931 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267 (D. Me. 2013). 
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for which plaintiffs were never eligible.219  Consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent, the similarly-situated inquiry is best understood as 
an expression of the substantive equal protection analysis.  But where 
it is applied as a threshold test, courts should not be confined by the 
formal separation of two programs that provide essentially the same 
type of benefit. 
III.  GUIDEPOSTS FOR ALIEN EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW 
The decisions reviewed in Part II should be both instructive and 
cautionary to state and federal courts that review similar equal pro-
tection challenges.  This section will draw out the critical lessons from 
those cases to provide courts with guideposts to follow in their as-
sessments of equal protection suits brought by aliens whom states 
have excluded from public-benefit programs.  These guideposts will 
help ensure that courts engage in the robust equal protection review 
that Graham and Mathews require. 
A.  Guidepost One:  Similarly Situated 
In the preceding section, I argued that courts should not apply a 
threshold similarly-situated analysis of aliens’ equal protection claims 
because such class comparisons are properly understood as part of 
the substantive equal protection review.  I noted, however, that many 
state courts and lower federal courts employ the threshold version 
and are unlikely to depart from that practice.220  For this reason I 
propose a two-part test for assessing who is similarly situated to plain-
tiff aliens.  Applying this test will avoid the Pham court’s error of 
prematurely dismissing meritorious equal protection claims. 
Before turning to my proposed test, I first consider the analysis 
that the Ninth Circuit used in Pimentel.  As noted above, Pimentel re-
jected the type of formalism on which Pham relied, where the state’s 
decision to provide benefits through one program or many programs 
would determine which beneficiaries were similarly situated to plain-
tiffs.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit suggested that “[a] careful considera-
tion of the contours of the [alien-excluding benefit program]” will 
 
219 See Bruns, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (“Because citizens were statutorily unable to receive 
health benefits under the same state-sponsored program, the Plaintiffs are unable to show 
they were similarly situated with citizens for equal protection purposes.”); Khrapunskiy v. 
Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70, 77 (N.Y. 2009) (“As there is no state program of aid for this class, 
there are no state residents receiving public assistance from New York at the level request-
ed by plaintiffs.”). 
220 See supra note 210. 
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demonstrate whether the beneficiaries of that program are similarly 
situated to the plaintiff class.221  These “contours” include “the statu-
tory scheme, source of funding, extent of state involvement, and his-
tory” of the benefit program.222 
This vague test223 was sufficient for the Pimentel court to reach the 
right result in that case, but I predict that it will lead to inconsistent 
results going forward.  Indeed, the one lower federal court to have 
employed it to date wrongly concluded that aliens terminated from a 
solely state-funded health benefit program were not similarly situated 
to individuals enrolled in Medicaid.224 
I argue instead that a court undertaking a similarly-situated in-
quiry need only make two determinations:  (1) the similarity of plain-
tiffs to benefit-receiving individuals with regard to characteristics rel-
evant to the purpose of the benefit at issue; 225 and (2) the degree to 
which the state funds the benefit those individuals receive.  The first 
determination is no more than an expression of the basic equal pro-
tection principle that similarity and dissimilarity must be evaluated as 
it relates to the purpose of the government (typically legislative) ac-
tion.226  The second determination ensures that the difference in 
treatment between the plaintiffs and the benefit-receiving individuals 
is properly attributable to the state. 
For example, suppose a state determines that low-income families 
with children have a particular need for health benefits, and it pro-
vides those benefits through a joint-funded benefit program.  The 
relevant characteristics for determining the state’s residents who are 
similarly situated with respect to these benefits would be income level 
and number of children in the family.  And the presence of state 
funds in the joint-funded benefit program indicates that the state has 
 
221 Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1108. 
222 Id. 
223 The court does not explain how (or to what degree) each of these “contours” is relevant 
to the question of similarity between plaintiffs and a class receiving more favorable state 
treatment.  Id. 
224 See Bruns, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (“After considering the ‘contours’ of the programs in 
dispute, the Court concludes that there were two separate benefit programs:  an aliens-
only program and a program for citizens and qualified aliens who satisfied PRWORA’s 
residency requirement.”). 
225 To the degree this rule begs the questions, “How relevant must these characteristics be?” 
and “What latitude does the state have in defining the purpose of the benefit?,” the an-
swer is that, as argued above, this analysis is part and parcel to substantive equal protection 
review.  Thus, what may constitute the purpose of the benefit program and what is the 
required degree of relevance between characteristics and purpose both depend on the 
standard of review being applied. 
226 See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 212, at 346 (“The inescapable answer is that we must 
look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law.”). 
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treated beneficiary families more favorably than low-income families 
with children who are not beneficiaries.227  The non-beneficiary fami-
lies would be similarly situated to the beneficiary families in an equal 
protection suit against the state. 
Applying my proposed similarly-situated analysis to the Pimentel 
case would reach the same (correct) result that the Ninth Circuit 
reached.  The Pimentel court held that Washington’s resident citizens 
receiving federal food benefits were dissimilarly situated from resi-
dent aliens who had received a now-terminated solely state-funded 
food benefit, even though both benefits were administered as a single 
program by a single state agency.228  Plaintiffs in this case meet the 
first part of my similarly-situated rule because they had similar rele-
vant characteristics (income level)229 to individuals receiving federal 
food benefits.  But they fail the second part of my rule because state 
funding of the federal food benefit program was nominal—the state 
funded only fifty percent of the administrative costs of the program, 
while the federal government funded the other half of those costs 
and 100 percent of the benefits.230  This result makes sense because a 
state should not be held responsible for the preferential treatment 
that results from federal, not state, funding. 
Applying this analysis to Pham, however, shows that the plaintiff 
class was similarly situated to individuals receiving Medicaid benefits.  
As in Pimentel, the plaintiffs had similar relevant characteristics (such 
as age, income level, and disability status) to Medicaid recipients.231  
What distinguishes Pham from Pimentel is that whereas Washington’s 
funding of the federal food benefit was nominal, Connecticut’s con-
tribution to its Medicaid program was upwards of $1.9 billion.232  
Thus, with respect to Connecticut’s support of need-based health 
benefits, the plaintiff class of needy aliens who received no health 
benefits was similarly situated to the needy citizens (and some aliens) 
who received Medicaid. 
 
227 If the characteristic that distinguishes the beneficiary and non-beneficiary families is sus-
pect, such as alienage, then strict scrutiny is required. 
228 Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1101, 1108. 
229 Id. at 1099. 
230 Id. at 1099, 1108; see also 7 U.S.C. § 2025 (2012) (requiring states to cover fifty percent of 
the program’s administrative costs). 
231 Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 642–43 (noting that the plaintiff class members 
are categorically eligible for Medicaid). 
232 Pham, 16 A.3d at 654. 
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B.  Guidepost Two: Alien Status 
A court reviewing an alien’s equal protection challenge will quick-
ly lose its way if it does not identify the plaintiff’s status as an alien 
with as much particularity as possible.  This status is critical to under-
standing how the alien and the benefits at issue fit within the 
PRWORA scheme.  Contrary to assertions made in the opinions re-
viewed above,233 an alien’s status under PRWORA is not binary, so it 
will not suffice to determine merely whether an alien is “qualified.”  
PRWORA provides different eligibility rules for state and federal pub-
lic benefits depending on whether an individual is a qualified alien, a 
nonimmigrant, or an undocumented alien.234  Grouping nonimmi-
grants with undocumented aliens runs the risk of wrongly applying 
rational basis review instead of strict scrutiny to a state’s exclusion of 
nonimmigrants from a state public benefit.235 
Courts must also pay attention to other characteristics of the 
plaintiff alien that affect eligibility under PRWORA, such as the date 
when the alien first entered the United States and how long the alien 
has resided with qualified status, because those characteristics dictate 
how much discretion a state may exercise.  As I explain further in the 
following subsection, recognizing which aspects of a state’s public-
benefit scheme are discretionary and which are federally mandated is 
critical to determining the proper standard of equal protection re-
view to apply.  Courts should apply strict scrutiny when states, rather 
than Congress, exercise discretion to restrict benefits for a class of al-
iens. 
C.  Guidepost Three: Uniform Federal Rule 
Once the court has identified the plaintiff’s alien status, the court 
should determine whether he or she is subject to a uniform federal 
rule under PRWORA.  These uniform rules in PRWORA include the 
five-year bar for qualified aliens and the permanent bar for nonim-
migrants from joint-funded benefit programs.  Determining the ap-
plicability of a uniform federal rule helps to define what a state must 
 
233 See, e.g., Bruns v. Mayhew, 931 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (D. Me. 2013) (“PRWORA divided 
noncitizens into two groups for Medicaid eligibility:  qualified and non-qualified aliens.”); 
Pham, 16 A.3d at 640 (“[PRWORA] divides aliens into two groups:  qualified and non-
qualified aliens.”); Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 406 n.2 
(Mass. 2002) (“A ‘qualified alien’ is one who has some legal residency status in the United 
States.  An alien who is not ‘qualified’ does not.” (citation omitted)). 
234 See supra Part I.B. 
235 For example, the supplemental TAFDC program in Doe extended benefits to qualified 
aliens, but not to nonimmigrants.  773 N.E.2d at 407. 
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provide its alien residents to comport with the command of equal 
protection.  For instance, QAs<5 excluded from Medicaid or TANF 
programs on account of the five-year bar have the right to only a pro-
rata match of the state’s contribution to those Medicaid or TANF 
programs.236  But if Congress has not made a class of aliens ineligible 
for a benefit, then any state effort to exclude such aliens must be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny and the appropriate remedy is enroll-
ment in the benefit program.237 
When, like in Soskin, PRWORA does not categorically bar the alien 
class from joint-funded benefit programs, a state that eliminates al-
iens from such programs contravenes the equal protection rationale 
of the Graham holding.  The state denies aliens state funds that it con-
tributes for the benefit of similarly-situated citizens.  But these situa-
tions also implicate the federalism rationale of Graham238 because the 
state also blocks alien access to federal funds that federal policy 
would permit.  Granted, federal policy also permits denying these al-
iens federal support, but a state-by-state determination of alien access 
to federal support creates a non-uniform immigration policy and 
raises the federalism concern of political accountability.239 
For example, a qualified alien is unlikely to know that his ineligi-
bility for Medicaid is a federal policy for his first five years of qualified 
status but an optional state policy thereafter.  Obscuring the source 
of a policy encumbers the mobilization of political forces against that 
policy.  Both the federalism and equal protection concerns that led 
the Graham court to apply strict scrutiny are present when state policy 
is akin to Colorado’s statute in Soskin. 
In contrast, if a court confronts a situation like Doe, where the al-
ien class falls under PRWORA’s five-year bar or other uniform rule 
regarding eligibility for a joint-funded benefit, then the court should 
apply Mathews deference, but only to Congress’s choice to deny the 
aliens federal funds.  PRWORA does not prevent states from creating 
alien-only state-funded benefits, such as supplemental TAFDC in Doe.  
Thus, a state’s participation in a joint-funded benefit without con-
tributing equal pro-rata funds to an alien-eligible benefit is a state, 
not federal, policy that treats aliens unequally on the basis of their al-
 
236 But if the state is providing its citizen residents additional benefits outside of Medicaid 
that it is denying its alien residents, comparable benefits must be provided to aliens as 
well. 
237 See supra Part II.B. 
238 See supra note 20. 
239 See Carrasco, supra note 28, at 628.  See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (dis-
cussing the tie between political accountability and federalism). 
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ienage.  This point will be explored in further detail in my next 
guidepost. 
D.  Guidepost Four: Adopted Alienage Classifications 
Courts must also be aware of the precise extent of PRWORA’s uni-
form rules.  Although these rules prohibit certain aliens’ enrollments 
in joint-funded benefit programs, they actual block these aliens’ re-
ceipt of federal-funded support.  The reason is because PRWORA al-
lows states to create solely state-funded programs that provide ex-
cluded aliens the same types of benefits that citizens and non-
excluded aliens (e.g., aliens with five years of qualified status) receive 
from the joint-funded programs.  For example, Connecticut created 
its SMANC program to give health benefits to aliens that PRWORA 
rendered ineligible for Medicaid.240  PRWORA’s uniform rule blocked 
these aliens from receiving health benefits supported by federal 
funds, but they nonetheless received health benefits supported by 
state funds. 
Understanding this limited scope of PRWORA’s uniform rules 
clarifies that a state’s participation in a joint-funded benefit program 
does not require the state to adopt the alienage classifications inher-
ent to the program’s eligibility rules.241  Courts have failed to recog-
nize that states retain the choice of whether to adopt for receipt of 
their own welfare dollars any or all of the federally imposed eligibility 
criteria (whether alienage-related or otherwise) attached to joint-
funded benefit programs. 
To be clear, I do not mean that states can ignore federal eligibility 
rules and enroll individuals that Congress has barred.  Instead, I 
mean that states can provide separate, solely state-funded benefits to 
a class of individuals excluded from the joint-funded benefit program 
because of any given criteria (e.g., income level, age, or alienage).  By 
so doing, state participation in the joint-funded benefit program no 
longer accords preferential treatment to individuals meeting those 
eligibility criteria. 
 
240 Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 641 (Conn. 2011). 
241 This point undermines the Pham court’s alternative holding that Connecticut’s participat-
ing in Medicaid “does not discriminate on the basis of alienage” because the classification 
is between those who meet the federal criteria for Medicaid and those who do not.  See id. 
at 657–59.  By providing aliens no health benefits whatsoever, Connecticut adopted an al-
ienage classification that PRWORA did not require—contributing significant state funds 
to a Medicaid program that helps citizens (and excludes most aliens) while failing to pro-
vide equal funding to a health-benefit program for aliens. 
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This guidepost requires some unpacking.  To do this, I will first 
use a simple hypothetical to show how states adopt federal classifica-
tions as their own through their funding of joint-funded benefit pro-
grams.  I will then use Pham as a real-world example of a state using 
solely state-funded benefits to reject some of the non-suspect classifi-
cations that the federal government imposes on Medicaid programs, 
while retaining the federally imposed alienage classifications. 
Suppose, for example, that two individuals are similarly situated in 
every respect except that X is blind and Y is sighted.  Pursuant to 
Medicaid’s eligibility criteria, X receives Medicaid benefits but Y does 
not.  A state’s funding of part of X’s Medicaid benefits constitutes 
preferential state treatment of X over Y.  In other words, the state is 
classifying on the basis of blindness.  But if the state provides equal 
state funds to a separate health benefit for Y, the state would no long-
er be treating X and Y differently—there would no longer be a state-
level blindness classification.  The state would thus participate in 
Medicaid without adopting Medicaid’s classification based on blind-
ness.  And the same principle holds for Medicaid’s (or TANF’s) al-
ienage classifications because no federal law impedes the states from 
providing solely state-funded benefits to aliens barred from Medicaid 
(or TANF).242 
The facts in Pham demonstrate how a state can participate in Med-
icaid but draw classifications different from those that Congress drew 
in establishing the baselines for Medicaid eligibility.  Through its 
SAGA-medical program, Connecticut uses state funds to extend Med-
icaid-like benefits to a subset of individuals who do not meet one of 
Medicaid’s “categorical eligibility”243 criteria.  A low-income Connecti-
cut resident who was not aged, blind, disabled, pregnant, or a parent 
of a dependent child could nonetheless qualify for the solely state-
funded SAGA-medical program.  As with the separate state-funded 
benefit in my blindness hypothetical, Connecticut’s provision of 
SAGA-medical essentially negates the classifications that the state’s 
participation in Medicaid would otherwise draw. 
Prior to the 2009 enactment of the statute challenged in Pham, 
Connecticut likewise negated the alienage classification that is other-
wise inherent to Medicaid participation.  It achieved this by providing 
SMANC and SAGA-medical to aliens excluded from Medicaid.  But its 
 
242 See 8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012) (allowing states to determine alien eligibility for state public 
benefits). 
243 This phrase “generally refers to those who are disabled, blind, pregnant, a parent of a 
dependent child, or an individual under twenty-one years of age or sixty-five years of age 
or older.”  Pham, 16 A.3d at 639 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a) (2006)). 
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elimination of SMANC and exclusion from SAGA-medical of individ-
uals ineligible for Medicaid because of alienage (while still providing 
SAGA-medical to persons ineligible for Medicaid because of other 
criteria) shows how Connecticut selected which aspects of Medicaid 
eligibility criteria it would adopt (alienage) and which it would reject 
(certain categorical eligibility criteria). 
In sum, PRWORA contains a uniform mandate that federal funds 
not support benefits for certain aliens.  But courts must not interpret 
this as a mandate that states commit more of their funds to the sup-
port of their in-need citizen populations than their in-need alien 
populations.  That decision is left to the states.  States that fund a 
separate benefit program for aliens at an equal pro-rata level as they 
fund a Medicaid or TANF program do not classify based on alienage; 
states that fund Medicaid and TANF programs with no separate bene-
fits for excluded aliens have voluntarily adopted alienage classifica-
tions. 
E.  Guidepost Five: Sources and Levels of Funding 
The essential lesson from Graham and Mathews is that the federal 
government has much wider latitude to make decisions that treat al-
iens and citizens differently than do state governments.244  This lesson 
forms the foundation of what must anchor a court’s equal protection 
analysis in the PRWORA context.  Rather than confine its analysis to 
the eligibility requirement of a particular benefit and which govern-
ment entity created that requirement, the court should look more 
broadly to the public-benefit scheme as a whole and ask:  Has the 
state decided to devote its resources to the benefit of its resident citi-
zens that it has not likewise devoted to its resident aliens? 
By looking beyond the facial classification to root out underlying 
state policy decisions that disadvantage aliens based on the fact of 
their alienage, courts will shut off a back-door method for Congress 
to authorize states to violate the Equal Protection Clause.245  Without 
this robust judicial review, nothing but political pressure will prevent 
states from funneling more and more of their funds through a feder-
al program to benefit citizens over aliens.  The futility of a discreet 
and insular minority’s reliance on the political process is a funda-
mental justification for the judiciary’s role in enforcing the mandates 
of equal protection.246  This justification is especially salient when that 
 
244 See discussion, supra Part I. 
245 See supra, note 134. 
246 See supra, note 18. 
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minority is a class of aliens, who by definition lack the basic tool of 
political power:  the vote.247 
IV.  EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS 
Proper attention to the guideposts outlined in Part III brings into 
focus the equal protection violations that result not only from reduc-
tions or terminations of existing public benefits for aliens, but also 
from the basic structures of state public-benefit schemes in the 
PRWORA era.  Whereas class actions brought by aliens to date have 
focused on the former, judicial recognition of the latter would signif-
icantly expand the scope of aliens asserting their rights of equal ac-
cess to public benefits.  Far more states have structured their public-
benefit programs to the disadvantage of aliens than have first provid-
ed, then reduced or terminated, benefits for aliens.  The following 
Part will describe three characteristics of these structures that render 
state-funded and joint-funded benefit programs equal protection vio-
lations.  In each section I will recommend actions that state legisla-
tures can take to remedy these violations. 
The first characteristic I will address is the denial of a joint-funded 
benefit to aliens for whom PRWORA does not bar eligibility by uni-
form rule.  Examples include denials of Medicaid and TANF benefits, 
as well as benefits under the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP).248  Next, I will turn to the expansion of joint-funded benefits 
for a state’s resident citizens but not aliens.  States can expand these 
benefits using solely state funds (administered within the joint-
funded benefit program or as a separate, supplemental benefit) or 
using both state and federal funds in a § 1115 demonstration pro-
ject.249  Finally, I address the choice to commingle state and federal 
funds in the provision of public benefits. 
A.  Soskin Situations 
State public-benefit schemes that deny joint-funded benefits to al-
iens for whom federal law permits eligibility are unconstitutional be-
cause they effect alienage classifications as a matter of state discre-
tion.  With regard to most qualified aliens, PRWORA allows the states 
to determine eligibility for not only solely state-funded benefit pro-
 
247 See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 341 (1993)(“The [Su-
preme] Court has viewed the vote primarily as a tool for exerting political power.”). 
248 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2006) (providing no uniform bar for eligibility for “child 
health assistance to uninsured, low-income children”). 
249 See supra note 107. 
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grams,250 but also joint-funded benefit programs.251  Although 
PRWORA uniformly bars qualified aliens from receiving these joint-
funded benefits for five years, states have discretion under § 1612(b) 
to effectively extend that bar.  States may also deny joint-funded ben-
efit eligibility to pre-enactment qualified aliens,252 a population that 
PRWORA does not uniformly exclude from such benefit programs.253  
Examples of states exercising this discretion in a manner that classi-
fies based on alienage are seen in the Medicaid, TANF, and CHIP 
contexts. 
1.  Denying Federally Available Medicaid and TANF Benefits 
As noted in the discussion of Soskin in Part II.B.1 above, Colorado 
exercised § 1612(b) discretion to make alien eligibility for parts of its 
Medicaid program more restrictive than Congress required.254  Other 
states have elected this restrictive option as well, limiting Medicaid 
benefits for aliens arriving in the United States after PRWORA’s en-
actment to only those qualified aliens for whom PRWORA requires 
coverage.255  These states include Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming.256 
Similarly, states have restricted qualified aliens’ eligibility for 
TANF benefits beyond PRWORA’s five-year bar.  For instance, Indi-
ana and Kansas provide TANF benefits after five years only to quali-
fied aliens who are refugees, asylees, and “persons granted a with-
holding of deportation,”257 while Idaho and Texas limit these benefits 
 
250 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012). 
251 See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (2012) (providing that, except for the mandatory five-year bar, “a 
State is authorized to determine the eligibility of an alien who is a qualified alien (as de-
fined in section 1641 of this title) for [TANF, social services block grants, and Medi-
caid]”).  States do not have such discretion under PRWORA with regard to joint-funded 
benefits for a small subset of qualified aliens that include refugees, asylees, veterans, 
members of the military, and legal permanent residences with credit for forty qualifying 
quarters of work.  See also id. § 1612(b)(2) (2012) (listing such exceptions). 
252 See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(D) (2012) (mandating joint-funded benefit eligibility for pre-
enactment lawfully residing aliens only until January 1, 1997); see also KARINA FORTUNY & 
AJAY CHAUDRY, URBAN INSTITUTE, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 9 (2011) (noting certain subsets of qualified aliens for 
which TANF and Medicaid eligibility is mandatory, but that “[s]tates can determine eligi-
bility for all other qualified immigrants”). 
253 See 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2012) (stating that the statutorily required five-year ineligibility 
applies only to aliens “who enter[] the United States on or after August 22, 1996”). 
254 See supra note 139. 
255 See supra note 251. 
256 FORTUNY & CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 13–14.  Wyoming also restricts Medicaid cover-
age for aliens arriving prior to PRWORA’s enactment.  Id.  
257 Id. at 31. 
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to only those qualified aliens who are battered spouses or children.258  
Mississippi and North Dakota are the most restrictive states, providing 
TANF benefits to only those qualified aliens for whom PRWORA 
mandates eligibility.259 
These states are denying qualified aliens benefits supported by 
both state and federal funds.  And unlike aliens who are ineligible for 
federally supported benefits because of the five-year bar, these aliens 
would be eligible for such benefits were it not for the states’ decisions 
to restrict eligibility.260  Graham suggests that a federal authorization of 
state-by-state alien-eligibility determinations contravenes the Naturali-
zation Clause’s uniformity requirement and thus cannot exempt the-
se state alienage classifications from strict scrutiny review.261  And 
states are unlikely to satisfy strict scrutiny because they lack a compel-
ling state interest for which these alienage classifications are the least 
restrictive means of advancement.262  Thus, state public-benefit 
schemes that are more restrictive of alien eligibility for joint-funded 
benefit programs than PRWORA requires are unconstitutional. 
2.  CHIP Eligibility 
Another important variant of “Soskin situations” that effects a state-
level alienage classification is a state’s barring legally residing chil-
dren and pregnant women from receiving benefits under CHIP.  
Created by federal statute in 1997,263 CHIP funding expands health-
benefit coverage to otherwise Medicaid-ineligible children and preg-
 
258 Id. at 31–32.  These populations covered by Indiana, Kansas, Idaho, and Texas are in ad-
dition to the qualified aliens for whom PRWORA mandates coverage.  See supra note 252. 
259 Id. at 31–32. 
260 For instance, thirty-nine states provide TANF benefits to all qualified aliens after the five-
year bar.  Id. 
261 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (noting that since “[u]nder Art. I, 
§ 8, cl 4, of the Constitution, Congress’ power is to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Natural-
ization,’” allowing each state “to adopt divergent . . . citizenship requirements for federal-
ly supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this explicit constitutional re-
quirement of uniformity”). 
262 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (describing what a state law that discrimi-
nates on the basis of alienage must do to withstand strict scrutiny); see also Soskin v. 
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The parties appear to agree that SB 
03-176 would not survive strict scrutiny . . . .”); cf. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. 
Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 984 (Mass. 2012) (holding that Massachusetts’s exclu-
sion from Commonwealth Care of aliens who are ineligible for federal support did not 
satisfy strict scrutiny). 
263 See generally Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33,, tit. I, subtit. J, 111 Stat. 251, 
275 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–1397mm). 
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nant women.264  Under the CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009 
(CHIPRA),265 states can choose whether to extend such coverage to 
lawfully residing266 alien children and pregnant women.267  The statute 
gives states this discretion explicitly notwithstanding the PRWORA 
provisions (e.g., the five-year bar or the required status as a qualified 
alien) that would make certain alien children and pregnant women 
otherwise ineligible for federally supported benefits.268  States may al-
so cover pregnant women, regardless of immigration status, through 
CHIP’s “unborn child” option.269 
Despite the availability of federal funds,270 twenty-nine states did 
not provide health-benefit coverage to lawfully residing children un-
der CHIP, and twenty-five states denied such coverage to lawfully re-
siding pregnant women.271  Thus, lawfully residing children and 
pregnant women in these states who are ineligible for Medicaid or 
stand-alone CHIP benefits because of an exercise of state discretion 
 
264 CHIP, like Medicaid, is a joint-funded program administered by the states.  See Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,  http://www.
medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Childrens-Health-
Insurance-Program-CHIP/Childrens-Health-Insurance-Program-CHIP.html (noting that 
the program “provides health coverage to nearly eight million children in families with 
incomes too high to qualify for Medicaid, but can’t afford private coverage”); see also id. 
(noting that states have the option to incorporate CHIP as an expansion of their existing 
Medicaid program (as elected by seven states, the District of Columbia, and five territo-
ries), to maintain CHIP as a separate benefit program (as elected by seventeen states) or 
a combination of Medicaid expansion and separate program (as elected by twenty-six 
states)); id. (stating that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat 119, 286 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(b)) provides that the feder-
al matching rate for CHIP after 2015 will increase an additional “23 percentage points, 
bringing the average federal matching rate for CHIP to 93%”).  Thus, states that do not 
allow their resident aliens to participate in CHIP will soon be denying that population a 
benefit that is almost entirely federal-funded. 
265 Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396). 
266 This is a broader category than “qualified aliens” under PRWORA.  FORTUNY AND 
CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 14. 
267  Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. for the Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services, to State 
Health Officials (July 1, 2010), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-
downloads/SMDL/downloads/SHO10006.pdf; see also FORTUNY AND CHAUDRY, supra 
note 252, at 4. 
268 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(4)(A) (2006). 
269 FORTUNY AND CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 14 (citing Letter from Jackie Garner, Acting 
Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to State Health Officials (May 11, 2009), 
available at https://www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SHO051109.pdf. 
270 Moreover, these federal funds are available at a higher matching rate than standard Med-
icaid reimbursement.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 264. 
271 FORTUNY AND CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 16.  These figures are current as of March 
2011.  Eight states had pending amendments to their Medicaid or CHIP plans to provide 
coverage to children and/or pregnant women.  Id. at 14.  Twenty-six states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia provided coverage to pregnant women directly, through the unborn 
child option, or both.  Id. at 16. 
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have viable equal protection claims.  Again, these state-by-state alien-
eligibility determinations warrant strict scrutiny because they are not 
the product of a uniform federal rule, and the states will be unlikely 
to meet that exacting review. 
3.  Remedying the Violation 
States that are denying joint-funded benefits to aliens for whom 
PRWORA does not bar eligibility can remedy these “Soskin situation” 
equal protection violations by enrolling the aliens in the joint-funded 
benefit programs—be it Medicaid, TANF, or CHIP—as they would 
similarly situated citizens.  A separate, state-funded, alien-only benefit 
would be an insufficient remedy because these aliens are eligible for 
federal support, and the state has no compelling interest in obstruct-
ing that support.  Nor can the states constitutionally place re-
strictions, such as durational residency requirements, on aliens’ re-
ceipt of these benefits that are not applied to citizens.  States need to 
amend their statutory or regulatory eligibility rules that currently bar, 
due to alienage, any individual from enrolling in a joint-funded bene-
fit program that PRWORA does not require to be so barred. 
B.  Expanding Joint-Funded Benefits for Citizens but Not Aliens 
The next characteristic of state public benefit schemes that impli-
cates certain aliens’ equal protection rights is the expansion of joint-
funded benefit programs (or the creation of state substitute pro-
grams) to cover persons otherwise ineligible for such benefits, while 
still excluding classes of aliens.  Two basic ways of achieving this selec-
tive expansion are through creating a state-funded program to pro-
vide a benefit comparable to that provided in the joint-funded pro-
gram and through § 1115 demonstration projects.272  Connecticut’s 
SAGA-medical program, for instance, used state funds to provide 
medical assistance to persons categorically ineligible for Medicaid, 
but not to persons ineligible for Medicaid solely due to alien status.273  
 
272 See BAUMRUCKER, supra note 107. 
273 See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (discussing Pham).  Another example of 
selective expansion through a state-funded program is found in Guaman v. Velez, 23 A.3d 
451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).  New Jersey excluded qualified aliens and nonimmi-
grants from its state-funded FamilyCare, “a state program created to provide subsidized 
health insurance coverage to low-income [families] . . . whose family incomes are too 
high for them to be eligible for traditional Medicaid.”  Id. at 468.  See also Avila v. Biedess, 
78 P.3d 280, 287–88 (upholding under strict scrutiny review Arizona’s Premium Sharing 
Program, which “is intended to be an extension of the [Medicaid] program available to 
persons whose incomes exceed the [Medicaid] limits” but nonetheless excludes aliens). 
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Similarly, Washington is an example of a state using federal funds se-
cured through a § 1115 waiver, along with state funds, to provide 
health insurance to its Medicaid-ineligible citizens but not to QAs<5 
or nonimmigrants.274  And although both of these examples concern 
Medicaid expansions, the same principle applies to TANF as well.275 
Both methods of selective expansion represent state choices to 
expend additional state funds for benefits that exclude certain aliens.  
Although the contours of state-funded benefit programs and § 1115 
demonstration projects vary, each has the potential to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause insofar as it contributes to a state’s discre-
tionary and preferential treatment of certain residents on the basis of 
alienage.  Just as a state’s participation in a joint-funded benefit like 
Medicaid is optional, so too is its choice to create a solely state-funded 
health benefit or to apply for, and allocate funds to, a § 1115 demon-
stration project that aids Medicaid-ineligible citizens but not certain 
Medicaid-ineligible aliens. 
But unlike the “Soskin situations” described in the preceding sub-
section, remedying these equal protection violations does not require 
states to enroll their alien residents into a joint-funded benefit pro-
gram.  Indeed, such a remedy would violate federal law to the extent 
it would extend federally supported benefits to PRWORA-barred al-
iens.  Nor does the Equal Protection Clause require states to use their 
own funds to compensate for what the federal government with-
holds.276  The proper remedy is to support a solely state-funded bene-
fit for aliens at the same pro-rata level that the state funds similar 
benefits for citizens.  Funding such a program would ensure that any 
difference between the level of benefits that aliens and similarly situ-
ated citizens receive is solely on account of a uniform federal rule 
and not state discretion, thus adhering both to Graham and Mathews. 
 
274 Unthaksinkun v. Porter, No. C11–0588JLR, 2011 WL 4502050 at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28, 
2011) (noting that the Washington program requires beneficiaries to be a “qualified alien 
for at least five years”).  Both the Commonwealth Care program at issue in Finch and the 
Medicaid program at issue in Korab are also operated under § 1115 waivers. 
275 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services announced in 2012 its will-
ingness to consider § 1115 waivers, which have been common in the Medicaid context, 
for TANF programs.  Letter from George Sheldon, Acting Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs., to State Human Service Officials (July 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/2012-ltr-gs-to-commissioners-im-2012-
03. 
276 See, e.g., Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1465–66 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause did not require California to compensate with state funds the 
cash-assistance benefits that Congress prohibited to the plaintiff class of aliens). 
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C.  The Choice to Mix State and Federal Funds 
The final and most prevalent characteristic of state public-benefit 
schemes that violates aliens’ equal protection rights is the state-level 
choice to commingle state and federal funds in a single benefit pro-
gram without providing a separate benefit for excluded aliens.  This 
constitutional defect pervades the health-benefit schemes of at least 
thirty-seven states and in the welfare-benefit schemes (i.e., TANF-
related benefit programs) of at least thirty-four states.277 
Because states’ participation in joint-funded benefit programs is 
voluntary—they are free to maintain benefit programs independent 
of federal funding or forgo providing benefits altogether—the com-
bining of state and federal dollars is a matter of state discretion.  This 
choice is significant because federal funding of a benefit renders 
many aliens (e.g., most QAs<5, and all nonimmigrants and undocu-
mented aliens) mandatorily ineligible under PRWORA.  In contrast, 
if a state maintains a benefit program without federal funding, then 
the state is free to provide the benefit to all of its resident aliens, re-
gardless of legal status. 
1. Comparing Commingling Options in Medicaid and TANF 
Both Medicaid and TANF programs exemplify this final character-
istic, but the exercise of state discretion to commingle funds is more 
explicit in the latter program than the former.  Federal Medicaid 
funding requires commingling with state funds because it is struc-
tured as a reimbursement:  The state spends its own money on cov-
ered services for its Medicaid-eligible population and recoups a cer-
tain percentage of those expenditures from the federal government.  
No federal reimbursement is payable for state health-benefit pro-
grams that do not meet the program requirements set by federal law, 
including PRWORA’s alien-eligibility rules.278  Thus, states have a 
choice to participate in Medicaid or not; but if they want federal 
Medicaid dollars, then commingling is necessary for at least a portion 
of the total state resources devoted to need-based medical assistance. 
Still, states are free to maintain separate health-benefit programs 
that do not meet Medicaid’s program requirements (e.g., provide 
 
277 See infra notes 280, 290, and accompanying text.  These estimates are based on states that 
do not provide solely state-funded benefits to QAs<5, but that does not capture the full 
extent of constitutionally defective state schemes.  Other legally residing aliens excluded 
from Medicaid or TANF programs have an equal protection right to separate state bene-
fits as well. 
278 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006) (outlining the payment of federal funds to states). 
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benefits to PRWORA-barred aliens) without suffering any penalty or 
reduction in their Medicaid reimbursement.279  As explained in Part 
III.C. above, funding Medicaid programs without a separate health-
benefit provision for aliens effects a state alienage classification.  But 
only fourteen states and the District of Columbia provided any type of 
solely state-funded health benefit to QAs<5 as of March 2011.280  
Health-benefit coverage of nonimmigrants is likewise limited, with 
most states offering no such coverage and many states limiting the 
coverage to specific subsets, such as children,281 aliens who were law-
fully present in the United States before PRWORA’s enactment,282 or 
certain aliens who are in long-term care.283 
TANF is similar to Medicaid in that states must contribute their 
own funds in order to qualify for federal funds284 (called “qualified 
State expenditures”285 but commonly known as the “maintenance of 
effort” requirement, or “MOE”286), but states may nonetheless main-
tain separate benefit programs.  However, unlike Medicaid, states re-
ceive TANF funds as block grants, not reimbursements.  Although 
states must contribute a certain level of their own funds to programs 
that promote one of the four overarching purposes287 specified by the 
 
279 Of course, any funds dedicated to a non-Medicaid program represent funds that could 
have been dedicated to the Medicaid program and thereby garnered additional federal 
reimbursement.  The Pham court proffered this point as a reason why in-need aliens were 
not similarly situated to in-need citizens, but the availability of federal funds is properly 
analyzed in the substantive equal protection analysis, where the court assesses the state’s 
interest (e.g., maximizing federal reimbursement to provide the highest level of benefits 
possible) and the relationship of the classification to that interest.  Cf. Windsor v. United 
States, 699 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding that a same-
sex couple’s alleged “diminished ability to discharge family roles in procreation and the 
raising of children” pertains to whether a federal statute could withstand scrutiny, “rather 
than upon the level of scrutiny to apply”). 
280 FORTUNY & CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 19. 
281 Illinois, Florida, and Washington are examples.  Id. at 16-17. 
282 Ohio and Rhode Island are examples.  Id. 
283 This is the case in Virginia.  Id. 
284 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7) (2006); see also 45 C.F.R. § 263.1 (2005). 
285 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7)(B)(i)(I) (2006). 
286 Liz Schott, LaDonna Pavetti & Ife Finch, How States Have Spent Federal and State Funds Un-
der the TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (Aug. 7, 2012), http://
www.cbpp.org/files/8-7-12tanf.pdf. 
287 These four purposes are:  “(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may 
be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of 
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and mar-
riage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish 
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; 
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (a) (2006); see also Schott, Pavetti, & Finch, supra note 284, at 1 (explaining the re-
quirement that expenditures promote one of the four TANF statutory purposes). 
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federal TANF statute, they need not commingle the state funds with 
federal TANF dollars for the expenditures to count towards the MOE 
requirement.288  More importantly, the separate state expenditures 
are not subject to the same restrictions placed on federal TANF 
funds, including PRWORA’s five-year bar and other mandatory alien 
exclusions.289  A state is therefore not only free to maintain a separate, 
solely state-funded benefit for which PRWORA-barred aliens are eli-
gible, but state funding for such a benefit would also help win the 
state federal TANF funds just as much as would commingling those 
same state funds in a joint-funded TANF program. 
Despite having the option to provide PRWORA-barred aliens 
state-only assistance and have that assistance count towards the MOE 
requirement, two-thirds of states (and the District of Columbia) pro-
vide no such assistance to QAs<5.290  Only seven states provide such 
assistance to any nonimmigrants.291 
2.  Consequences of Commingling 
The discretion to provide certain public benefits through solely 
state-funded programs or through commingling state and federal 
funds in joint-funded programs gives states several options for how to 
spend state resources allocated to public welfare.  The following ex-
ample will summarize these options in the context of health-benefit 
programs to illustrate three points:  (1) channeling state funds into a 
joint-funded benefit program without a separate provision for ex-
cluded aliens is a state-level alienage classification; (2) equal protec-
tion does not mandate equal levels of benefits between aliens and cit-
izens; and (3) states can take advantage of federal funding while still 
comporting with the Equal Protection Clause. 
Consider a state that has $1 billion to provide medical assistance 
to residents that it deems, based on non-suspect criteria, are in need 
(e.g., low-income families, individuals with disabilities or blindness, 
 
288 See 45 C.F.R. § 263.2(a) (2005) (noting that “[e]xpenditures of State funds in TANF or 
separate State programs may count” if made for certain types of benefits or services). 
289 Id.; see also Schott, Pavetti & Finch, supra note 284, at 29; Elizabeth Lower-Basch, TANF 
Policy Brief:  Guide to Use of Funds, CLASP 8 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.clasp.org/
resources-and-publications/files/Guide-to-Use-of-bTANF-Funds.pdf (noting that state ex-
penditures qualify as MOE even when they assist families who are excluded from federal-
funded TANF programs because of PRWORA). 
290 DAVID KASSABIAN, ANNE WHITESELL & ERIKA HUBER, URBAN INST., WELFARE RULES 
DATABOOK:  STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2011 50–51 (2012), available at http://www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/412641-Welfare-Rules-Databook-2011.pdf. 
291 Id.  For instance, only nonimmigrants “with employment authorized by U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services are eligible for assistance” in Wisconsin.  Id. at 51 n.12. 
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etc.).  I will call these residents the “in-need population.”  Suppose 
one million people comprise the in-need population and that ninety 
percent of them are citizens, while ten percent are, for the sake of 
simplicity in illustrating the point of this example, QAs<5.  The state 
thus has $1,000 per person to provide medical assistance to the in-
need population and four options:  (1) put the entire $1 billion in a 
Medicaid program; (2) put $900 million in a Medicaid program and 
$100 million in a solely state-funded health benefit program for qual-
ified aliens; (3) fund Medicaid and the qualified-alien benefit such 
that the levels of benefits in both programs are equal, even account-
ing for the federal government’s contribution into Medicaid; and (4) 
put the entire $1 billion into a solely state-funded benefit for the en-
tire in-need population (forgoing Medicaid entirely). 
Under option 1, the state maximizes the total pool of funds avail-
able for providing medical assistance to the in-need population be-
cause it puts all of the state funds into a program that garners match-
ing federal funds.  If the state receives the minimum federal 
matching rate, fifty percent,292 then $1 billion of state funds invested 
in Medicaid would reap an additional $1 billion in federal funds for 
the program.  But maximizing the total size of the pie comes at the 
cost of unequal distribution:  The state’s resident citizens would re-
ceive a benefit valued at $2,222 per person, while its resident aliens 
would receive no benefits. 
Option 2 represents a pro-rata division of available state funds 
among the in-need population.  Ninety percent of the funds go into 
Medicaid, benefitting the ninety percent of the population that are 
citizens, while ten percent of the funds go into the solely state-funded 
health-benefit program for the ten percent of the population that are 
qualified aliens.  The resident citizens still benefit from matching 
federal funds, although to a slightly lesser degree ($900 million in 
federal money, as opposed to the $1 billion under option 1).  As 
such, the resident citizens’ Medicaid benefits would be funded at 
$2,000 per person.  The resident aliens’ state-funded benefit would 
be funded at $1,000 per person. 
Option 3 is an equal-outcome scenario.  If the state wants to pro-
vide its qualified aliens the same level of benefits that its resident citi-
zens receive, then it must match the federal government’s per-person 
contribution to Medicaid with additional funds for its qualified-alien 
benefit.  Where the federal contribution to Medicaid is a dollar-for-
dollar match, achieving equal benefits would require the state to ded-
 
292 See supra note 135. 
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icate twice the amount of funds per person in the qualified-alien 
benefit than in Medicaid.293  In this hypothetical, the state would put 
$818,181,818 ($909.09 per resident citizen) into Medicaid and the 
remainder in the qualified-alien benefit.  Matching federal funds for 
Medicaid would produce a benefit valued at $1,818.18 per person, 
which would equal the benefit that qualified aliens received, albeit 
solely from state funds. 
Option 4 is also an equal-outcome scenario, but produces a lower 
level of benefits than option 3.  By forgoing Medicaid and its match-
ing federal funds, the $1 billion in state funds would fund a $1,000-
per-person benefit for the entire in-need population.  Qualified al-
iens would be no better off than they were under option 2, but citi-
zens would be considerably worse off. 
Option 1 effects a state-level alienage classification because the 
state chooses to spend all of its available funds on a benefit program 
that excludes aliens.  Option 3 produces equal outcomes but has its 
own potential constitutional difficulties.  This spending choice consti-
tutes preferential treatment of aliens over citizens and could be vul-
nerable to an Adarand-style294 equal protection challenge.  Or it could 
be challenged on preemption grounds because the separate, dispro-
portionately funded state program for aliens would essentially negate 
any effect of PRWORA to augment the level of public benefits re-
ceived only by citizens (and certain aliens).  Option 4 also produces 
equal outcomes, and it comports with equal protection principles; yet 
it fails to maximize the potential benefits for the entire in-need popu-
lation. 
Only option 2 maximizes the level of benefits under the parame-
ters of comporting with equal protection and respecting Congress’s 
policy of federal funds not benefitting certain aliens.  The state makes 
equal pro-rata contributions towards health benefits for its residents 
irrespective of alienage, while the higher level of benefits that some 
residents will receive is purely the result of a uniform federal policy.  
This example shows that states can take advantage of federal match-
ing funds, even if the award of such funds requires funneling state 
 
293 See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Authority, 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 
(Mass. 2011) (noting that “[d]ue to the level of Federal reimbursement, at least two fed-
erally eligible residents (citizens or federally eligible aliens) could be enrolled in Com-
monwealth Care for the same cost to the State as one member of the plaintiff class”). 
294 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (imposing a strict scrutiny 
standard on an affirmative action program).  See also Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 
1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (considering Washington’s FAP program, which “provides benefits 
exclusively to federally ineligible legal immigrants, while denying such benefits to citizens 
and federally eligible qualified aliens”). 
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money into a benefit program that excludes aliens, while still accord-
ing its resident aliens and citizens equal protection of the law.  It also 
demonstrates that equal protection in this context does not signify 
equal outcomes.295 
3.  Remedying the Violation 
Options for remedying equal protection violations that are the re-
sult of commingling state and federal funds depend on the benefit-
program context in which the funds are commingled.  First, com-
mingling is inherent to the reimbursement structure of Medicaid 
programs and, as explained above, a state that forgoes Medicaid alto-
gether would miss out on substantial federal funds for supporting its 
in-need population.  The best way for states to remedy the alienage 
classification that they would otherwise effect through Medicaid par-
ticipation is to fund separate, solely state-funded health-benefit pro-
grams for aliens.  State contributions to both programs must be equal 
on a pro-rata basis.  These separate state programs would effectively 
cure the constitutional defects that funding Medicaid without such 
programs creates:  The dedicating of greater state resources to the 
benefit of in-need citizens than in-need aliens. 
States have more flexibility in the TANF context because states 
can receive federal TANF funds without having to commingle those 
funds with state funds.  And the segregated state funds nonetheless 
count towards the level of MOE that states must achieve to qualify for 
the federal funds, even if federally ineligible aliens (e.g., nonimmi-
grants and QAs<5) are benefitting from the state funds.296  If states 
want to continue to commingle MOE and federal TANF funds into a 
single benefit program, they can follow the model of the Medicaid 
remedy and create a separate, alien-only program supported by a lev-
el of MOE equal (on a pro-rata basis) to the MOE dedicated to the 
joint-funded program. 
 
295 See Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70, 77 (N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he right to equal protection 
does not require the State to create a new public assistance program in order to guaran-
tee equal outcomes under wholly separate and distinct public benefit programs.  Nor 
does it require the State to remediate the effects of PRWORA.”).  But recognizing that cit-
izens and aliens with equal levels of need are similarly situated before the state’s decision 
to participate in Medicaid neither requires a state to “guarantee equal outcomes” nor 
“remediate the effect of PRWORA.”  Id.  Indeed, resident citizens (and aliens not barred 
under PRWORA) can continue to receive a higher level of benefits than similarly situated 
aliens because, under the rule of Mathews, the federal government is free to deny aliens 
federal support. 
296 See supra notes 277–89 and accompanying text. 
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Alternatively, states can keep their MOE completely separate from 
federal TANF funds.  With this remedy, aliens and citizens alike 
would benefit from the MOE funding streams, while only citizens 
(and federally eligible aliens) would benefit from the federal TANF 
funding stream as well.  In either case, the state must ensure (1) that 
it does not withhold MOE-funded benefits from a legally residing al-
ien (whether qualified or nonimmigrant) on the basis of alienage, 
and (2) that it excludes federally ineligible aliens from benefit pro-
grams supported by federal TANF funds. 
CONCLUSION 
The current mode of equal protection review of PRWORA-era 
state decisions to deny aliens public benefits is inadequate.  Some 
courts avoid equal protection review altogether by applying a thresh-
old analysis of whether the alien plaintiffs are similarly situated to a 
class that has received favorable state treatment.  Other courts merely 
label the classification as “state” or “federal” and apply the accompa-
nying standard of review.  In both instances, courts ignore the under-
lying policy options that PRWORA and programs like Medicaid, 
TANF, and CHIP leave open to the states, as well as how those op-
tions can vary depending on the particular statuses of the alien plain-
tiffs. 
This Article has proposed that courts (1) abandon or at least mod-
ify their threshold similarly situated inquiries, (2) focus on the status 
of the alien bringing the equal protection challenge, (3) determine 
the public-benefit options available to states with regard to aliens of 
that status, (4) look out for states adopting alienage classifications 
through their participation in joint-funded benefit programs, and (5) 
assess states’ funding decisions in light of their impacts on aliens and 
citizens who are similarly in need of public benefits.  With proper fo-
cus on these factors, courts can ensure that public-benefit schemes 
meet the constitutional requirements outlined in Mathews and Gra-
ham.  On one hand, this nuanced equal protection review will uphold 
Congress’s prerogative, expressed through a uniform national policy 
in PRWORA, to provide increased support (that is, support in excess 
of what the states provide) for citizens and select aliens.  On the oth-
er hand, it will hold state-level discriminatory treatment of aliens to 
the strict-scrutiny standard that Graham requires. 
Moreover, this Article has shown that aliens’ equal protection 
rights are implicated not only by the termination of benefits that they 
once received, but also through other, less-obvious state actions.  
Such actions include blocking alien access to available federally sup-
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ported benefits, expanding joint-funded benefit programs for citizens 
but not aliens, and choosing to commingle state and federal funds in 
an alien-excluding benefit program without maintaining a separate 
and equally state-funded benefit program for aliens. 
These policy choices are far more common than the termination 
of benefits that class actions have challenged to date.  States should 
voluntarily address these equal protection violations by adopting the 
remedies outlined in Part IV.  But if they do not, courts must apply 
the searching review that the Equal Protection Clause requires.  This 
review will prevent states from using PRWORA as a shield for their 
own policies of forcing a disenfranchised population to bear the 
brunt of tightening welfare budgets. 
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CHART 1 – ALIEN ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC BENEFITS UNDER PRWORA 
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Note: Chart based on, with modifications, ZIMMERMANN & 
TUMLIN, supra n.36 at 15. 
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“40Q work” means an alien who has worked or can be credited 
with 40 qualifying quarters of coverage as defined under Title II of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and did not receive 
federal means-tested benefits during those quarters of work. 
“Military” means an alien who is a veteran or on active duty in the 
armed forces, or a spouse or dependent child of such an alien. 
1 – Qualified aliens who were receiving SSI before 8/22/1996, or 
who are disabled or become disabled, are eligible.  40Q work and 
Military are also eligible. 
2 – PRUCOLs who were receiving SSI before 8/22/1996 are eligi-
ble. 
3 – Only pre-1996 qualified aliens who are under eighteen years 
old, disabled or blind, or were 65 years or older on 8/22/1996, are 
eligible.  40Q work and Military are also eligible. 
4 – 8 U.S.C. § 1621 makes non-qualified aliens ineligible, unless, 
per § 1621(d), a state passes a law after 8/22/1996 that “affirmatively 
provides for such eligibility.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
